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INTRODUCTION
A decade ago we proposed the use of the tools of corpus linguistics in the interpretation of legal language. First in a student
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law review note 1 and then in a concurring opinion, 2 we began to
highlight a series of shortcomings in traditional tools for assessing
the ordinary meaning of legal language (etymology, dictionaries,
judicial intuition) and to propose that corpus linguistic analysis
could fill those voids. We extended our ideas in further opinions, 3
blog posts, 4 workshops, 5 and conferences. 6 And we eventually presented a thorough defense of the use of corpus linguistics in statutory interpretation in Judging Ordinary Meaning, 7 an extensive article followed by other pieces proposing extensions of the
methodology to constitutional 8 and contract interpretation. 9
Corpus linguistics is the study of language through the
analysis of large bodies of naturally occurring text. By sampling
and analyzing words and phrases in their natural setting we can
access evidence about meaning and usage that before we could only
guess about, making our assessment of the meaning of the language of the law more transparent and independently verifiable.

1
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Note, The Dictionary Is Not a Fortress: Definitional Fallacies
and a Corpus-Based Approach to Plain Meaning, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1915, 1919 [hereinafter
Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies].
2
J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 723–29 (Utah 2011)
(Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
3
See, e.g., State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1275–82 (Utah 2015) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (using corpus linguistic analysis to ascertain
the meaning of “discharge” in a statutory scheme and describing how corpus linguistics
works to aid judicial decision-making when resort to dictionary definitions does not reveal
ordinary meaning in light of multiple possible definitions).
4
See, e.g., Thomas Lee & Stephen Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning with Corpus
Linguistics, WASH. POST (Aug. 8, 2017), https://perma.cc/8NSU-GFXF [hereinafter Lee &
Mouritsen, Corpus Linguistics].
5
See, e.g., 19th Annual Faculty Conference: Corpus Linguistics and Legal Interpretation, FEDERALIST SOC’Y (Jan. 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/6MQL-ZFFQ.
6
The Brigham Young University J. Reuben Clark Law School has held a Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference for each of the last five years. See Call for Papers: 5th Annual
Law & Corpus Linguistics Conference, BYU L., https://perma.cc/UQS8-7YJX. The Section
on Law and Interpretation of the Association of American Law Schools also convened a
program on “Corpus Linguistics: The Search for Objective Interpretation” at the annual
meeting in New Orleans in January 2019. See Program: 2019 AALS Annual Meeting,
ASS’N OF AM. L. SCHS. (Jan. 2019), https://perma.cc/3K22-ZJTB. Many of the ideas in this
Article were presented at the BYU conference in 2020 and the AALS meeting in 2019.
7
See generally Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning,
127 YALE L.J. 788 (2018) [hereinafter Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning].
8
See generally Thomas R. Lee & James C. Phillips, Data-Driven Originalism, 167
U. PA. L. REV. 261 (2019).
9
Stephen C. Mouritsen, Contract Interpretation with Corpus Linguistics, 94 WASH.
L. REV. 1337 (2019) [hereinafter Mouritsen, Contract Interpretation].
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Judges, scholars, and advocates have begun to take note. In
recent opinions, judges on various state supreme courts 10 and federal courts of appeals 11 have accepted the invitation to bring corpus
linguistic analysis to bear in the interpretation of legal language.
And in 2018, Justice Clarence Thomas employed the tools of corpus
linguistics in two separate opinions on questions of constitutional
law. 12 Judges are not alone in this regard; legal scholars 13 and practicing lawyers 14 are also increasingly advocating the use of these
tools.
Not everyone is impressed. Our advocacy for the increased
use of corpus linguistic tools in legal interpretation has drawn
skepticism and criticism from various quarters. And the criticism
has exploded of late—with a range of scholars seeking to pump
the brakes on or outright repudiate the utility of corpus tools in
10 See, e.g., Richards v. Cox, 450 P.3d 1074, 1079–81 (Utah 2019); State v. Lantis,
447 P.3d 875, 880–81 (Idaho 2019); People v. Harris, 885 N.W.2d 832, 838–39 (Mich.
2016); Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1275–82 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
11 See, e.g., Caesars Ent. Corp. v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local
68 Pension Fund, 932 F.3d 91, 95–96 (3d Cir. 2019) (employing corpus linguistics in conjunction with dictionary definitions to interpret the phrase “previously required” and concluding, in part because “previously” most commonly “co-occurred with . . . ‘had’ (35%) and
‘been’ (15%)—perfect tense verbs that connote completed action,” that “to say something
is ‘previously required’ is to suggest it is no longer required”); Wilson v. Safelite Grp., Inc.,
930 F.3d 429, 439–45 (6th Cir. 2019) (Thapar, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (proposing the use of corpus linguistics as one “important tool” in the “judicial
toolkit” and relying on searches in the Corpus of Historical American English to further
support the majority’s statutory conclusion); see also, e.g., Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d
695, 700 n.1 (6th Cir. 2019) (taking the unusual step of asking the parties to submit supplemental briefing on whether corpus linguistic analysis helped illuminate the original
meaning of Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement but noting “that corpus linguistics turned out not to be the most helpful tool” in this particular case).
12 See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238–39, 2238 n.4 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (using corpus linguistics to argue that the term “search” in the
Fourth Amendment “did not mean a violation of someone’s reasonable expectation of privacy” “[a]t the founding”); Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (quoting NLRB v. SW Gen., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 929, 946 (2017) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (relying on a law review article, Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the
United States”?, 70 STAN. L. REV. 443, 564 (2018), that used corpus linguistic analysis and
concluding, like that article, that “Officers of the United States” “encompassed all federal
civil officials ‘with responsibility for an ongoing statutory duty’”).
13 See generally, e.g., Jennifer L. Mascott, Who Are “Officers of the United States”?,
70 STAN. L. REV. 443 (2018); Lawrence M. Solan, Can Corpus Linguistics Help Make
Originalism Scientific?, 126 YALE L.J.F. 57 (2016); Lawrence M. Solan & Tammy Gales,
Corpus Linguistics as a Tool in Legal Interpretation, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1311.
14 For example, the emoluments litigation after President Donald Trump’s election
drew substantial attention from linguistics scholars. See generally, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Professor Clark D. Cunningham and Professor Jesse Egbert on Behalf of Neither
Party, In re Trump, 928 F.3d 360 (4th Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2486).
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law. Some of the criticism questions the viability of our proposed
methodology by challenging the speech community that our
methods have sought to test 15 or suggesting that there is a public
notice problem with a resort to tools that the public lacks the
means or expertise to access. 16 A more recent piece in the Harvard Law Review presents a more fundamental, empirical critique. 17 In that article, Professor Kevin Tobia advances the results
of an extensive series of surveys aimed at demonstrating that corpus tools are an inaccurate measure of ordinary meaning 18 and
are systematically biased in favor of the wrong sense of ordinary
meaning (“prototypical” meaning). 19 Tobia also presents his survey results in support of a further criticism (echoed by other scholars)—that corpus tools credit only the “most frequent” sense of a
given legal term—the wrong measure of ordinary meaning. 20
We welcome the pushback. The method that we have proposed is novel and disruptive. And the opportunity to respond to
our critics will help refine the methodology that we advocate,
situate it more carefully within existing theories and practices
of interpretation, and either refute or credit the major critiques
that have been identified.
That said, some of the criticisms have posited a caricature of
our proposed approach. With that in mind, we begin in Part I with
clarification and refinement of our central idea—that the tools of
corpus linguistics can address shortcomings of existing tools for
assessing the ordinary meaning of legal language. The balance of
the Article is a response to the main criticisms that have been
raised to date. In Part II we address concerns about whether corpus tools are aimed at the right speech community. Here we clarify that the choice of speech community presents a problem for legal theory—an intentionalist who is interested in crediting the
meaning attributed to a lawmaker would want to study specialized
legislative speech, while a textualist who is concerned about public
notice would be more interested in the everyday language of the
15 See Evan C. Zoldan, Corpus Linguistics and the Dream of Objectivity, 50 SETON
HALL L. REV. 401, 430–35 (2019); Anya Bernstein, Democratizing Interpretation, 60 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 435, 458–60 (2018).
16 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Corpus Linguistics and the Criminal Law, 2017 BYU
L. REV. 1503, 1514–16.
17 Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 727, 753–77 (2020).
18 See id. at 766.
19 See id. at 770.
20 See id. at 759, 792; see also Hessick, supra note 16, at 1506.
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public. We also acknowledge that there may be circumstances
where language evidence from different regions, industries, social
backgrounds, or racial, ethnic, or community identities may appropriately be brought to bear on an interpretive question. And
we emphasize that this concern is not a weakness but a strength
of corpus tools, which allow the interpreter to construct a corpus
of any appropriate speech community and analyze the language
of that community.
Part III speaks to questions about whether a lack of public
access to corpus analysis raises notice concerns. We concede the
need for fair notice and acknowledge that corpus tools will not be
accessible to the general public. But we show that concerns about
fair notice cut against maintaining the status quo and strongly in
favor of the addition of corpus tools to the judge’s existing toolbox.
In Part IV we turn to Tobia’s “accuracy” criticism—the claim
that corpus analysis is problematic because it fails to paint an
accurate picture of ordinary meaning. Tobia’s accuracy charge is
based on the premise that the results of his “concept condition”
surveys paint an accurate picture of ordinary meaning. 21 Tobia
also argues that corpus analysis is biased in a particular way—
that it measures only language “prototype,” and is premised on a
fallacy of “nonappearance” (that the nonappearance in a corpus of
any uses of a tested term means that such use does not count as
“ordinary”). 22 We highlight a range of problems with these criticisms. We note that Tobia’s starting premise (the accuracy of Tobia’s “concept” surveys) is merely presumed with no open attempt
to defend it and little engagement with relevant social science literature on survey methods. We engage with that literature and
identify a broad range of reasons why this premise is wrong. And
we show that Tobia’s critiques of corpus methods are also
flawed—that the purported fallacies are based on a misunderstanding of our methods and that the “prototype” results that Tobia complains about flow not from corpus analysis generally but
from Tobia’s survey design.
In Part V we consider what seems to be the most persistent
claim of our critics (Tobia, and also Professor Carissa Byrne
Hessick)—that our methods always credit only the most frequent
sense of a tested term in a corpus. This misstates our position. We

21
22

Tobia, supra note 17, at 772–74.
Id. at 789–90, 795.
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respond to it by highlighting the utility of corpus tools in assessing any of a range of senses of ordinary meaning.
We conclude with some observations about next steps.
Though most of the criticisms either misstate our proposals or
highlight concerns that backfire on our critics, some of them help
underscore the need for us to enhance and refine the interpretive
methodology that we envision. We close with some thoughts on
specific steps that can be taken.
I. LAW AND CORPUS LINGUISTICS: RESTATEMENT AND
REFINEMENT
The critics of corpus methods have raised important questions. But along the way they have also missed some fundamental
tenets and important nuances of our proposed approach. With
that in mind, we begin with a restatement and refinement of the
potential contributions of corpus linguistic analysis set forth in
our prior writings. To do so, (A) we highlight the deficiencies of
the principal tools and techniques currently used by judges to discern the communicative content of legal texts; (B) we describe the
corpus linguistic enterprise and explain how tools imported from
this field can help address existing shortcomings; and (C) we synthesize and summarize the principal contributions of the use of
the methodology of corpus linguistics in the law of interpretation.
A.

The Why of Corpus Linguistic Analysis: Deficiencies in
Current Legal Interpretation

The first step for any inquiry into the meaning of a legal text
is the search for its “communicative content”—the intended and
understood meaning of the words of the law. 23 Jurists have long
described the communicative content of legal texts as the “ordinary” or “plain” meaning of the law. 24 The inquiry into communicative content is sometimes distinguished from an attempt to discern the law’s legal effect—its legal content. 25 Scholars sometimes

23 Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 479, 480 (2013).
24 See William Baude & Ryan D. Doerfler, The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 539, 545 (2017).
25 See Solum, supra note 23, at 480.
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refer to the first of these tasks as “interpretation” and the latter
as “construction.” 26 Our focus is on the former.
Ordinary meaning is crucial to the interpretative enterprise
because, as Professor William Eskridge, Jr., has written, “[a] polity governed by the rule of law aspires to have legal directives
that are known to the citizenry, that are predictable in their application, and that officials can neutrally and consistently apply
based upon objective criteria.” 27 And while the search for “ordinary meaning does not always yield predictable answers,” it does
“yield greater predictability than any other single methodology.” 28
Almost everyone agrees that a search for the communicative
content of the law is the starting point when interpreting the language of law. And countless cases thus frame the interpretive
question in terms of a search for the ordinary meaning. And
where a court can discern the ordinary or plain meaning, that is
the end of the interpretive analysis. 29
Yet the general consensus on the appropriate starting point
masks latent conflicts—acknowledged and subconscious—about
our search for ordinary meaning. One set of unresolved problems
goes to our legal theory of ordinary meaning. Another is in operationalizing the theory. In highlighting these two sets of problems
we will refer to two of the canonical Supreme Court cases, which
we considered in our recent scholarship—Muscarello v. United
States 30 and Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific Saipan, Ltd. 31 And we show
that the problems are ongoing by including a more recent case,
Mont v. United States. 32
Each of these cases presents a question of lexical ambiguity
(the core kind of problem for which we have proposed the use of
corpus tools)—a choice between alternative senses of a given statutory term or phrase. In Muscarello the question was whether a
person “carries a firearm,” as that term is used in the mandatory
minimum sentencing provision in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), when
26 See id. at 483; Amy Barrett, The Interpretation/Construction Distinction in Constitutional Law: Annual Meeting of the AALS Section on Constitutional Law, 27 CONST.
COMMENT. 1, 1 (2010).
27 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (2016).
28 Id. at 36 (emphasis in original).
29 Presumably this is what Justice Elena Kagan means when she says, “[W]e’re all
textualists now.” The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY at 8:29 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/APM3-Y9EU.
30 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
31 566 U.S. 560 (2012).
32 139 S. Ct. 1826 (2019).

2021]

The Corpus and the Critics

283

he transports it in the glove box of a truck he drives to a drug
deal. 33 The interpretive question has no plain answer—each side
has a plausible definition of “carry,” and the Muscarello Court
was deeply divided, producing a 5–4 vote. 34 Taniguchi presented
a similar kind of problem. There the question was whether the
ordinary meaning of “interpreter” under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 is limited to real-time translation of oral speech or also includes
translation of written texts. 35 Again the Court was split (this
time 6–3), 36 and again each side has a plausible interpretation of
the statutory term. Mont was along the same lines. There the
question was whether the ordinary meaning of “imprison[ment]
in connection with a conviction” for a crime under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3624(e) is limited to terms served after the conviction is entered
or encompasses terms of pretrial detention that are later credited
in the ultimate sentence. 37 The Mont Court was also deeply split
(5–4) and again the dispute was over two plausible senses of the
statutory term. 38
The threshold problem in these kinds of cases is in our imprecision in the theory of what we are seeking to measure. Are we
looking for the understanding of a legislator, or of a member of the
public who is governed by the law? Should we interpret a legal instrument through the lens of modern, linguistic conventions, or
conventions from the time that it was drafted and went into effect?
What are we looking for when we search for the plain or ordinary
meaning of the language of law? Are we asking about the most
common sense of a given term or phrase, or just whether a term
is often or permissibly used in a certain way? And how do we resolve ambiguity if the meaning of the text is not clear?
Judges speak confidently about the need to credit ordinary
meaning. But we have no “ordinary meaning of ordinary meaning.” 39 When we speak of ordinary meaning, we sometimes seem
to be seeking the understanding of a legislator and sometimes
seem to be seeking public meaning. More fundamentally, we are

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 126–27.
See id. at 126.
35 Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 562.
36 See id. at 561.
37 Mont, 136 S. Ct. at 1829 (alteration in original).
38 See id.
39 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 798 (quotation
marks omitted).
33
34
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inconsistent in the standard that we have in mind (permissible
versus most frequent use, etc.). 40
These problems are on display in Taniguchi, Muscarello,
and Mont. In Taniguchi, the majority says that only a real-time
translator falls within the ordinary meaning of “interpreter.” In
so concluding it asserts that “an interpreter is normally understood as one who translates orally from one language to another.” 41 Although the majority concedes that a written translator
could also be spoken of as an interpreter, that sense is rejected as
“hardly a common or ordinary meaning.” 42 The dissent seems to
have a different sense of ordinary meaning in mind. It concludes
that a written translator is an interpreter because we use the
term that way “more than occasionally.” 43 The majority and dissenting opinions in Muscarello are perhaps even more problematic. The majority opinion is internally inconsistent—asserting
that transporting a gun in a glove box is within the ordinary
sense of “carry” both because it is a common sense of the term
and insisting that this is the “primary” sense of the term. 44 And
the dissent has parallel problems. 45
These imprecisions are also reflected in the more recent opinions in Mont. In concluding that pretrial detention falls within
the meaning of a provision that tolls a term of supervised release,
the majority said that the phrase “imprisoned in connection with
a conviction” “may well include” and can “encompass” a term of
“pretrial detention credited toward another sentence for a new
conviction.” 46 The dissent had a different conception of ordinary
meaning in mind. It sought for “normal usage” or “the colloquial
sense” of the statutory phrase—the one “most naturally understood in context.” 47

See id. at 800.
Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added).
42 Id.
43 Id. at 576 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
44 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128–29 (asserting that “many”—“perhaps more than onethird”—of the uses of “carry” with respect to a “vehicle” and “weapon” in the New York
Times and U.S. News databases reflect the “transport-in-a-car” sense of carry, while also
stating that this sense is the “primary” sense that Congress had in mind).
45 See id. at 143–44 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting “that ‘carry’ is a word commonly used to convey various messages,” and that it “could mean” either personally bear
or transport in a vehicle (emphasis added)); id. at 149 (stating that the personally bear
sense of “carry” is “hardly implausible nor at odds with an accepted meaning” of the statutory terms (emphasis added)).
46 Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832.
47 Id. at 1837–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
40
41

2021]

The Corpus and the Critics

285

Imprecisions in our theory of ordinary meaning are one problem. Yet additional problems are apparent when we examine the
tools that jurists employ in operationalizing ordinary meaning.
Judges typically measure ordinary meaning by resort to linguistic
intuition and by reference to dictionaries, etymology, and canons
of construction. Yet these tools are insufficient. Their weaknesses
have been discussed at length elsewhere, both by us and others. 48
But we briefly sketch the major problems associated with each
below.
1. Judicial intuition.
Judges often begin and end their assessment of a text’s linguistic meaning with a gut-level intuitive determination. As a
competent English speaker, a judge may present her view of the
ordinary understanding of a phrase like “carry a firearm” simply
based on her intuitive understanding of the language. This is an
inevitable—and entirely appropriate—starting point for interpretation. But there are ample grounds for questioning the wisdom
of relying exclusively on the intuition of an individual judge as
the end point.
Absent corpus linguistic analysis, “a judge has no way of determining whether . . . her own interpretation is widely shared.” 49
And because “humans tend to notice unusual occurrences [of
words] more than typical occurrences,” judges run the risk of
overcrediting the frequency of obscure word senses when relying
exclusively on intuition. 50 This risk is exacerbated when a word
has many different senses.
The inquiry into ordinary meaning is typically framed as a
search for how the ordinary, reasonable person would understand
a given term or phrase. 51 Yet the judge represents only a single
data point—a data point that is unlikely representative of the
48 See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 806–07;
Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 1, at 1925–26, 1939–41; Solan & Gales, supra
note 13, at 1331–36; James A. Heilpern, Dialects of Art: A Corpus-Based Approach to Technical Term of Art Determinations in Statutes, 58 JURIMETRICS 377, 380–81 (2018).
49 Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt & Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias in
Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268, 1273 (2008).
50 DOUGLAS BIBER, SUSAN CONRAD & RANDI REPPEN, CORPUS LINGUISTICS:
INVESTIGATING LANGUAGE STRUCTURE AND USE 3 (1998).
51 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 65 (1988) (“We should look at the statutory structure
and hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable
user of words. . . . The meaning of statutes is to be found . . . in the understanding of the
objectively reasonable person.”).
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general population. Judges are generally wealthier and better educated than the average American and have often spent significant time studying at elite institutions. Such judges may not be
ideally suited to make gut-level assessments of ordinary usage. If
the question is whether “carry a firearm” is typically limited to
personal bearing (rather than transporting in a vehicle), the judge
may not be in a good position to answer the question.
The problem may be compounded by the introduction of a
time-dimension problem. A modern originalist judge, for example,
may posit the need to interpret historical documents in light of
the semantic conventions of the time they were drafted and ratified. But he may not be in a good position to intuitively assess the
meaning of language enacted in prior eras due to “linguistic
drift—the notion that language usage and meaning shifts over
time.” 52 His twenty-first-century linguistic intuition may be out of
sync with the original ordinary meaning of the text presented.
Some changes in the language of law can be quite dramatic and
occur for no apparent reason and can be nigh unto impossible for
a judge to detect. 53
The judge may also bring latent biases or prejudices about
preferred outcomes in cases that come before her. Opening the
door to judicial resort to intuition risks motivated reasoning and
confirmation bias. And it obscures the basis of judicial decisions,
precluding the ability of parties, counsel, or commentators to assess and challenge the decision. An implicit or explicit “take my
word for it” decision is impossible to question or falsify.
2. Dictionaries.
Perhaps because of these limitations on human linguistic intuition, judges frequently turn to dictionaries for help. 54 When a
judge cites a dictionary, she is seeking to avoid the appearance of
a subjective decision by a single individual and to signal objectivity and authoritativeness. But there is often more veneer than
Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 265.
See John W. Welch & James A. Heilpern, Recovering Our Forgotten Preamble, 91
S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1065 (2018).
54 See, e.g., Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 566–69 (citing a wide range of dictionaries in support of the conclusion that the ordinary sense of “interpreter” is limited to real-time translation of oral speech); Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (first citing 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989); then citing WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY 343 (1986); and then citing RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 319 (2d ed. 1987)) (supporting the conclusion that transporting
something in a vehicle is within the primary sense of the verb “carry”).
52
53
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substance to this impulse—not just because dictionaries do not
emerge from some lexical Mount Sinai (a fallible “someone sat
there and wrote the dictionary”) 55—but also because dictionaries
typically do not answer the ordinary meaning questions presented to courts. In most cases, the dictionary will simply show
that both sides have a plausible argument.
This is true in the canonical cases that we have studied. In
Muscarello and Taniguchi, both the majority and dissenting opinions cited dictionaries in support of their views: The Muscarello
majority cited a “convey . . . in any vehicle” definition of “carry” 56
and the dissent cited a “bear . . . upon the person” definition. 57 The
Taniguchi majority cited “oral[ ]” translator definitions of “interpreter” 58 and the dissent cited a broader sense (that included the
translation of written texts). 59
The competing opinions in Mont are a bit more nuanced. The
majority cites dictionary definitions of “imprison” in support of its
view that this term can “encompass pretrial detention.” 60 And the
dissent focuses more on the need to assess phrasal meaning, while
insisting that the “natural[ ]” or “normal” usage of “imprisoned in
connection with a conviction” is “postconviction incarceration.” 61
But again dictionaries are front and center.
A further problem is in the details of the courts’ reliance on
dictionaries. Judges tend to cite dictionaries for propositions they
do not establish. A principal problem is in what we have called
the “sense-ranking fallacy”—the notion that a given sense of a
statutory term is ordinary (in the sense of being more commonly
used) because it is listed higher in the dictionary’s list of senses.
This is on display in Muscarello, where the majority credits the
“transport in a vehicle” sense of carry because it is listed ahead of
55 Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 1, at 1916 (quoting Lawrence Solan,
When Judges Use the Dictionary, 68 AM. SPEECH 50, 50 (1993)).
56 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919 (2d
ed. 1989)).
57 Id. at 143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Carry, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th
ed. 1990)).
58 Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 568–69, 568 n.2 (asserting that “only a handful” of dictionaries include the written translator sense of “interpreter” but “all” of them speak of the
oral translator sense).
59 See id. at 576 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
60 Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832 (stating that “the term ‘imprison’ has meant ‘[t]o put in a
prison,’ ‘to incarcerate,’ [and] ‘[t]o confine a person, or restrain his liberty, in any way’”
(first quoting Imprison, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed. 1979); and then quoting 5 THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 113 (1933)) (citing Imprison, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014))).
61 Id. at 1837–38 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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the “personally bear” sense in the Oxford English Dictionary’s list
of senses. 62 But the analysis is fallacious, as evidenced by the fact
that the very dictionaries relied upon by courts explain that the
order of definitions is either arbitrary or reflects historical usage
(oldest first). 63 And this again underscores the need to look elsewhere to check judicial intuition, or to more reliably discern and
determine the ordinary meaning of the language of the law.
3. Etymology.
Judges also sometimes look to a word’s etymology—its historical pedigree in other languages—to help decipher its linguistic
meaning. The majority made this move in Muscarello. It noted that
the verb “carry” traces from “the Latin ‘carum,’ which means ‘car’
or ‘cart,’” and “from Old French ‘carier’ and late Latin ‘carricare,’
which meant to ‘convey in a car.’” 64 And on that basis the Court
concluded that the ordinary meaning of the phrase “carry a firearm” must include transporting it in a locked glove compartment. 65
This again is fallacious. The idea that the ordinary meaning
of words in phrases in our language can be assessed by the way
they were used in completely different languages in centuries
past is incoherent. That’s not how language works. “[W]ord[s]
needn’t mean forever what they meant in Greek or Latin.” 66 If
they did, “December would mean the tenth month, and an anthology would mean a bouquet of flowers.” 67
4. Canons of construction.
Judges may also look to “linguistic” or “semantic” canons—
often Latin-labeled principles that claim to identify shared
62 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (citing 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 919
(2d ed. 1989)) (crediting the former sense as “primary” and dismissing the latter as “special” and noting that the “first” definition in the Oxford English Dictionary is the transport
sense).
63 See 1 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY xxix (2d ed. 1989) (“[T]hat sense is placed
first which was actually the earliest in the language: the others follow in the order in
which they appear to have arisen.”).
64 See Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128 (first quoting THE BARNHART DICTIONARY OF
ETYMOLOGY 146 (Robert K. Barnhart ed., 1988); and then quoting 2 THE OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 919 (2d ed. 1989)).
65 See id.
66 R.L.G.,
The Etymological Fallacy, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2011),
https://perma.cc/R9MB-QCZB.
67 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 7, at 809 (emphasis in original) (providing the etymology of “anthology,” THE BARNHART CONCISE DICTIONARY OF ETYMOLOGY 29 (Robert K.
Barnhart ed., 1995), and “December,” id. at 188).
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premises or conventions of language usage—to inform their
search for the ordinary meaning of statutory language. 68 Examples include the notion that the meaning of a word may be informed by the meaning of surrounding terms and phrases
(ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis) and the presumption that
each word or phrase in the law should be given independent
meaning (the surplusage canon). 69
Canons have been around for centuries and purport to articulate shared premises of how language is ordinarily understood
in context, potentially providing an air of objectivity and authoritativeness like dictionaries. But like dictionaries, canons also fall
short for a number of reasons. First, there is internal tension in
the way the canons are framed. At most they state rebuttable presumptions. And the law surrounding canons has never done a
good job of identifying the circumstances in which the presumption should be rebutted. This highlights a related (and more central) problem. It is unclear whether they in fact capture ordinary
usage. Thus, courts have cited these canons for centuries without
questioning whether (or when) they are consistent with ordinary
language usage, which means that the linguistic premises that
undergird them are untested. That is problematic. This leads to a
third, related problem. Many of the canons are subject to countercanons, 70 which open the door to the very subjectivity and motivated reasoning that resort to ordinary meaning claims to avoid.
Canon-based reasoning is invoked in Mont. There the majority buttresses its interpretation of “imprisonment in connection
with a conviction” by reference to the surplusage canon. 71 Because
the statute speaks not just of imprisonment but “imprisonment in
connection with a conviction,” the majority says that imprisonment must be interpreted broadly. 72 “[I]f imprisonment referred
only to ‘confinement that is the result of a penalty or sentence,’”
the majority says that “the phrase ‘in connection with a conviction’ [would] becom[e] entirely superfluous.” 73

68 William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV.
1079, 1084, 1088 (2017).
69 See id. at 1087, 1126.
70 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules
or Canons of About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–06 (1950).
71 Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832 (alteration omitted).
72 Id. (alteration omitted).
73 Id. (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Goins, 516
F.3d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 2008)).
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As with dictionaries or the use of judicial intuition, the point
is not that linguistic canons are never helpful. It’s just that they
may not always be independently up to the task of gauging ordinary meaning. These canons should “stand or fall” by whether
they reflect ordinary use in a given linguistic setting. 74 And they
will not always do that.
The Mont analysis is illustrative. The surplusage canon has
great force in some linguistic settings. But no one thinks that
every term in every legal phrase always has independent meaning. We also have a countercanon that speaks to the idea of surplus language included in an abundance of caution or by way of
emphasis. The Supreme Court invoked the countercanon in the
same term in which it decided Mont—in Rimini Street, Inc. v.
Oracle USA, Inc. 75 There the Court acknowledged prior cases in
which it had said that “some redundancy is hardly unusual” in
some statutory settings. 76 Thus, the Court embraced a general
rule favoring an “interpretation of a statute” that “would avoid
redundancy” over an alternative interpretation that “would cause
some redundancy.” But it emphasized that this is only a presumption—noting that “[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the
statute contains some redundancy.” 77
This is the difficulty with the surplusage canon, and many
others. A canon isn’t a hard-and-fast rule. They are general presumptions subject to rebuttal. And unless and until we can speak
clearly about the proper basis for the presumptions and the
grounds for rebuttal, we will not have a set of tools that can
properly cabin our judges’ intuition in legal interpretation.
***
If judicial intuition, dictionaries, etymology, and linguistic
canons are insufficient tools for discovering a statute’s ordinary
meaning, what is to be done? We see three possible answers:
First, we can abandon the “the view that we can explain our legal
norms by pointing to the ordinary communicative content of our

Baude & Sachs, supra note 68, at 1084.
139 S. Ct. 873 (2019).
76 Id. at 881 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 568
U.S. 371, 385 (2013)).
77 Id.
74
75
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legal texts” (the “Standard Picture”) 78 completely and revive the
premises of “strong purposivism”—freeing judges to make decisions based on some sort of sense of the purpose or intent of the
legislature, with the text as a secondary consideration. 79 Second,
we can bury our heads in the sand and continue to pretend that
there are no problems with our faulty tools in the name of convention or tradition because we’ve always done it that way. Or
third, we can open our eyes to the problems with our existing
methods and search for new tools and solutions that will do a better job of helping judges and practitioners evaluate claims about
the meaning of legal instruments. We can evaluate whether and
to what extent existing tools successfully provide evidence of
meaning, and whether such tools (like the canons of interpretation) can be reformulated to better represent prevailing linguistic
conventions. We see the third answer as the only viable one, and
we see the tools of corpus linguistics as an important step forward
in the law’s attempt to better capture the “standard picture.”
B.

The How of Corpus Linguistic Analysis: A Primer

Corpus linguistics is a subfield of linguistics that investigates
real language use and function by analyzing electronic collections
of naturally occurring texts. These collections are called “corpora,” and are digitally searchable compilations of real-world
sources—books, newspapers, speeches, scholarly articles, television transcripts, etc.—drawn from a particular speech community
and annotated with linguistic metadata. They are designed to be
representative samples of all of the language produced by a community, and therefore reflect (both in diversity and relative frequency) the language patterns within that community. 80
Linguists have designed a number of different tools for analyzing the evidence drawn from these databases, many of which
we have barely begun to think about in terms of how they might
assist the judge in her judicial task. But here we will focus on just
two—what linguists refer to as “collocation” analysis and “concordance line” analysis.

78 Baude & Sachs, supra note 68, at 1086 (citing Mark Greenberg, The Standard
Picture and Its Discontents, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 39, 48 (Leslie
Green & Brian Leiter eds., 2011).
79 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1,
23 (2006).
80 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 828–33.
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Collocation is simply “the tendency of words to be biased in
the way they co-occur.” 81 By examining collocation in a corpus, we
can identify words that tend to occur in close proximity with
terms we are assessing—a collocate is just a word neighbor. This
can give us a starting point for an attempt to discern the range of
senses of a given word that we may wish to test further. 82
Corpora also permit the analysis of concordance lines. A concordance line is a sample sentence from real-world language that
shows how a queried word or phrase has been used in the past. 83
For a judge or lawyer, this can make the corpus “like Lexis on
steroids,” 84 enabling her—through the use of computer-aided
searches—to “assemble a greater number of examples” of a particular word or phrase used in a particular grammatical and topical context than she could “summon by memory.” 85 By doing so,
the judge can check her intuition to ensure that it conforms with
the way language is actually used, and not the result of her own
idiosyncratic linguistic tendencies.
Justice Stephen Breyer took a step in this direction in his opinion in the Muscarello case when he cited some sample sentences
from the New York Times database in LexisNexis to support his
view that we often speak of “carry” in terms of transporting something in a vehicle. 86 Corpus linguistics takes this impulse a step
further by allowing us to use more reliable tools employed by
linguists to gauge the most common usage of terms like “carry”
a firearm and “harbor” an alien through searches of large databases producing replicable, falsifiable datasets of actual language
usage. This is the premise—and promise—of corpus linguistic
analysis.
Some have characterized the corpus linguistics project as introducing a new “theory of interpretation.” 87 Others dismiss it as
useful only for textualists or originalists, or as presupposing the

81 SUSAN HUNSTON, CORPORA IN APPLIED LINGUISTICS 68 (2002); see also John R.
Firth, A Synopsis of Linguistic Theory, 1930–1955, in STUDIES IN LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS 1,
14 (1957) (“Collocations are actual words in habitual company.”).
82 See HUNSTON, supra note 81, at 76.
83 See Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 1, at 1958.
84 Brief for the Project on Government Oversight, the Brechner Center for Freedom
of Information, and Tax Analysts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, FCC v.
AT&T, Inc., 562 U.S. 397 (2011) (No. 09-1279).
85 State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1271 (Utah 2015) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment).
86 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 129–30.
87 Hessick, supra note 16, at 1526 n.96.
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primacy of these theories. 88 But these are mistaken premises.
Corpus linguistic analysis is not a theory of interpretation; it is a
tool for assessing ordinary usage of language in context. Such a
tool takes no position on the judge’s preferred theory of interpretation. Indeed, the tool may be useful to question some of the
premises of textualism and originalism. As noted above, the insights from the corpus linguistics project can offer ammunition to
those who seek to question the objectivity or determinacy of the
search for ordinary (or original) meaning. To that extent this tool
may be quite valuable to the antitextualist, or living constitutionalist—who may use corpus linguistic methods to highlight the indeterminacy of language, and open the door to more pragmatic,
purposivist inquiries. Such theories, moreover, typically at least
start with a nod to ordinary meaning. 89 So corpus linguistics is
not a theory, and it’s hardly just for textualists.
How does corpus linguistic analysis work? The starting point
is to answer a series of threshold questions:
(1) What is the relevant speech community I want to investigate? Should the judge assume that the legal text she is interpreting is written in ordinary American English? Or is it
written in a legal “dialect”? 90 The answer to this question
may depend on whether the judge agrees with Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr., who argued that “it is reasonable that
a fair warning should be given to the world in language that
the common world will understand, of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed,” 91 or Justice Stanley Reed who
felt that “[i]n the interpretation of statutes, the function of
the courts is . . . to construe the language so as to give effect
to the intent of Congress” 92―a Congress that is

88 See, e.g., John S. Ehrett, Against Corpus Linguistics, 108 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50, 72
(2019) (“Judges committed to textualism and originalism may see in this new methodology
the potential to resolve longstanding debates over linguistic subjectivity and finally triumph over the demon of arbitrariness. But corpus-based research is a temptation the judiciary should resist.”).
89 See, e.g., John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 70, 87 (2006) (“While purposivism is characterized by the conviction that
judges should interpret a statute in a way that carries out its reasonably apparent purpose
and fulfills its background justification, purposivists start—and most of the time end—
their inquiry with the semantic meaning of the text.”).
90 See Heilpern, supra note 48, at 394.
91 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (emphasis added).
92 United States v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940).
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demographically wealthier, better educated, and contains a
greater percentage of lawyers than the nation as a whole.
(2) What is the relevant time period I want to investigate?
Should the Constitution or statute be interpreted according
to the linguistic conventions at the time it was enacted? Or
reflect the understanding of people reading it today?
The answers to these questions will determine which corpus
a judge should use in a particular case. An original public meaning originalist interpreting the Commerce Clause might want a
corpus composed of documents written or read by the general public during the Founding Era. An original methods originalist
might want to limit her search to legal documents from that
time period. And a living constitutionalist who believes that the
Constitution should be interpreted in light of society’s evolving
standards would be more interested in examples drawn from a
modern corpus. The same is true with statutes. Judges who prioritize fair notice in statutory interpretation may want to consult
a modern, general corpus―especially for criminal statutes―while
those who view themselves as “faithful agents of the legislature” 93
may wish for a corpus of congressional speech from the time of
enactment, such as all of the legislative history created by a specific Congress. The evidence drawn from different corpora may
point to different answers to the same question, but it is the judge’s
legal theory that makes the difference. Corpus linguistics simply
helps judges operationalize their normative values―whatever they
may be―in a systematic and scientific manner.
After answering these threshold questions, a judge could assemble concordance line evidence to inform the inquiry into the
ordinary meaning of the language of law according to her interpretive theory. We have done so in an attempt to offer some evidencebased answers to the questions that the courts were opining on in
Muscarello, Taniguchi, and Mont. The tools that the judges used
in those cases weren’t up to the task of discerning ordinary meaning. But corpus linguistic analysis can at least begin to fill in some
of the gaps.
Our corpus analysis has uncovered linguistic evidence that
can make the inquiries in these cases more transparent. For each
of the above cases, we were able to assemble objective evidence of

93 Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV.
405, 435 (1989).
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ordinary meaning that cannot be derived from the use of dictionaries, etymology, or linguistic canons.
In assessing the problem in Muscarello, we determined that
the verb “carry” co-occurs with the word “firearm” (or its synonyms) in 109 codable concordance lines in the News on the Web
(NOW) Corpus. 94 Of those lines, 104 refer to personally transport
a gun, only 5 to transporting a gun in a vehicle. 95
As to Taniguchi, we found that the noun “interpreter” appears in 188 codable concordance lines in the NOW Corpus. Of
those lines, we found none that refer to the text-to-text written
translator idea. 96
We presented our corpus analyses of Muscarello and
Taniguchi in our prior scholarship. 97 We refer the reader to that
work for the details of our analyses. We have not previously considered the Mont case, however. And the corpus tools introduced
above can also be used to analyze the ordinary meaning question
presented there, in a manner highlighting some of the important
contributions of these tools.
A threshold question, as noted, concerns the relevant language community. This is a point on which the majority and dissent in Mont disagreed—albeit without really acknowledging that
this was a focus of their disagreement. The majority cited both
general-usage and legal dictionaries in support of its view of “imprison,” 98 while the dissent looked to usage of this term in the U.S.
Code and the Sentencing Reform Act. 99 So the majority is imagining (at least in part) a general-usage language community, while
the dissent has in mind a more specialized community of statutory language.
Corpus tools can provide evidence of the use of “imprison” in
either of these communities. We can assess the former by looking to the use of this term in Corpus of Contemporary American
English (COCA). A search for the verb “imprison” in COCA generates two hundred codable concordance lines where the object of
the verb is a person. Of those, thirty make clear reference to a
person being detained after conviction, thirty-three could be
Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 847.
Id.
96 Id. at 849–50.
97 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 845–48 (presenting corpus analysis of the Muscarello case); id. at 848–50 (presenting corpus analysis
of Taniguchi).
98 Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832.
99 See id. at 1838 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
94
95
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referring to either pre- or post-conviction, and fifty-five refer to
detainment without conviction. Another twenty-five lines were
unclear or made reference to some other meaning (like a metaphorical use).
We can also assess use of “imprison” in a statutory setting.
We did so by searching use of the term in a corpus of the U.S.
Code prepared by linguist Jesse Egbert. Here we found two hundred codable concordance lines that use the verb “imprison” in
connection with a person as a direct object. One hundred ninetyfive of those lines referred to post-conviction detainment, one
could be viewed to refer to either pre- or post-conviction detainment, and none refer to detainment pre-conviction.
This evidence can serve as a check on a single judge’s linguistic intuition. It can also help refine and focus our legal theory on
the inquiry into ordinary meaning. Does the corpus evidence also
paint a conclusive view of the “standard picture”—the ordinary
meaning of the statutory text?
The answer to this crucial question is that it depends—on
some refinements that need to be made to our (legal) interpretive
theory of the nature of the “standard picture” (or in other words
our view of what we are looking for in our search for ordinary
meaning). Those refinements will require us to decide whether
ordinary meaning encompasses only the most frequent sense of a
term in a given context, to all permissible meanings of a term, or
perhaps to the term’s prototypical meaning. We must also explore
how the law’s search for ordinary meaning fits in the broader
structure of the law of interpretation—whether and when we end
the interpretive enterprise with the “standard picture,” and how
the ordinary meaning inquiry interacts with other premises of the
law of interpretation (such as substantive canons of construction).
We offer some answers to these questions in the course of our
responses to critics in Parts II–V below. For now, we are focused
on the ordinary meaning inquiry. And we are confident in concluding that corpus linguistic analysis can fill in some significant
holes in our existing methodologies, even if it can’t resolve all of
the problems it highlights with our existing approach to the
“standard picture.”
C.

The Contributions of Corpus Linguistic Analysis

Corpus linguistics cannot solve all of the problems described
above. But its potential contributions are significant.
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1. Transparency.
First, corpus linguistic analysis can promote greater transparency in the assessment of ordinary meaning. Without this tool,
judicial analysis in this field resides within the black box of judicial intuition, or, worse, under tools that provide a false sense of
objectivity and authoritativeness (as under the sense-ranking fallacy as applied to dictionaries, the fallacy of etymology, or the decision to credit an untested linguistic canon). The tools of corpus
linguistics can begin to provide checks on these forms of judicial
analysis.
Textualists have accused purposivists of abusing legislative
history in a manner that amounts to “looking over a crowd and
picking out your friends.” 100 Meanwhile, purposivists accuse textualists of doing the same thing with semantic tools and canons
in an attempt to justify a preferred outcome. 101 The problem of
motivated reasoning is a real one. Some empirical work in the
Chevron domain is a stark illustration. Scholars have shown that
a judge’s partisan alignment is among the greatest predictors of
whether the judge will defer to an agency under Chevron: “Where
the [judges’] partisanship aligned with the direction of the agency
outcome, those judges were more likely to [find the statute ambiguous and] affirm the agency’s interpretation.” 102 The attempt
to judge ambiguity by intuition overlaps substantially with the
attempt to assess ordinary meaning. There will always be a risk
of motivated reasoning or confirmation bias. The introduction of
an evidence-based tool like corpus linguistic analysis can help reduce this risk.
The evidence-based methodology of corpus linguistic analysis
can help force a judge to show her work. To begin with, a judge
100 Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (“It sometimes seems that citing
legislative history is still, as my late colleague [Judge] Harold Leventhal once observed,
akin to ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.’”).
101 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism: An
Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
749, 752 (1995); Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine,
72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 372 (1994).
102 Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd & Christopher J. Walker, The Politics of Selecting
Chevron Deference, 15 J. EMPIRICAL L. STUD. 597, 601 (2018); see id. at 608–09, 614 (finding that this only held true for liberal panels, not conservative ones who applied Chevron
consistently regardless); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Do Judges Make Regulatory
Policy? An Empirical Investigation of Chevron, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 851 (2006); Frank
B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175 (1998).
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will need to articulate her normative assumptions and values in
order to justify her use of a particular corpus and to describe her
search parameters. Ideally, a judge would then provide the public
with a copy of her coded concordance lines (as exemplified in two
amicus briefs submitted to the Supreme Court, which included
links to spreadsheets available online 103) and detailed instructions about how to replicate her search (as one of us has done in
a judicial opinion 104). Fellow judges on the panel, reviewing judges
on appeal, and legal scholars could check her work to ensure that
she has not manipulated the evidence or engaged in motivated
reasoning. One of the great virtues of corpus linguistics is that it
is falsifiable. Critics can replicate the judge’s search to test her
conclusions. And if the judge has engaged in cherry-picking or
motivated reasoning, a replicated search will reveal this and expose the judge to public criticism.
2. Refining legal theory.
Second, corpus linguistics can help promote some needed and
overdue refinements to our legal theory of interpretation. One of
the more difficult problems highlighted by the corpus linguistics
project is the law’s failure to speak precisely about what we are
looking for in inquiring into ordinary meaning. Are we looking for
the most common sense of a given term or phrase in a given linguistic setting? Or is it enough that a given sense is attested and
somewhat frequent? The debate in the Muscarello case highlights
the law’s imprecisions in this regard. In that case the majority
opinion says it is seeking the ordinary meaning of “carry” a firearm, but in the Court’s analysis it seems to be alternatively either
looking for the most common sense of this term or for simply a
permissible one. 105
It is tempting to say that this highlights a fatal problem with
the attempt to assemble corpus evidence of ordinary meaning.
But the problems highlighted above do not go away if we abandon
the idea of evaluating claims about meaning with usage evidence.
We could keep guessing about ordinary meaning using our
103 See Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Corpus Linguistics at 18 n.11, Lucia v. SEC,
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018) (No. 17-130); Brief of Amici Curiae Scholars of Corpus Linguistics
Supporting Petitioners at 18 n.21, Rimini Street, Inc. v. Oracle USA Inc., 139 S. Ct. 873
(2019) (No. 17-1625).
104 See J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 725 n.26 (Utah
2011) (Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
105 Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128.
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intuition, or pretend to find objective support for our sense of ordinary meaning using dictionaries or etymology or linguistic canons. Without the evidence, we could mask the fact that we have
long been imprecise about what we mean by ordinary meaning.
But the question would still remain unanswered.
The question, moreover, is one for legal theory—not linguistics. If we struggle to find an answer to the question whether the
law is interested in the most common sense of a given term,
simply a common sense, or even a linguistic prototype, then it is
because the law hasn’t decided what question it is asking when it
seeks after ordinary meaning. Linguistic tools can help us measure whatever it is we decide we want to measure. We lawyers just
need to decide what we’re looking for. And interest in the use of
corpus linguistics in legal interpretation has already helped us
see the need for this refinement.
3. Testing the tools of statutory interpretation.
Corpus linguistics also provides the means for testing the validity of many of the traditional tools of statutory interpretation.
One of the main contributions of corpus linguistics so far has been
in highlighting the deficiencies of our current methods of interpretation, such as those discussed in Part I.A. Scholars have been
able to show that dictionaries and etymology are poor tools for
assessing ordinary meaning. But there is still so much work left
to be done. Corpus linguistics provides a means of testing the socalled linguistic canons. Do they actually reflect linguistic usage?
And if so, from when?
Further analysis of our linguistic canons is in order. And we
can utilize corpus linguistic analysis to determine the extent to
which the canons accurately reflect linguistic practices by beginning to identify the circumstances in which the presumptions set
forth in the canons should hold and when those presumptions
may be rebutted. Corpus analysis of extant canons may also help
the legal profession identify new presumptions not yet reflected
in our canons—a new set of canons, which are supported by linguistic evidence but not yet reflected in our law.
***
The law and corpus linguistics project is still in its infancy.
But it has much to offer. Already it has helped highlight the deficiencies of the methods currently used by judges to discover the
communicative content of legal text. If judges are serious about
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our search for ordinary meaning, they should heartily embrace
this new methodology, regardless of their jurisprudential leanings or views of the nature of legal interpretation. Doing so will
improve transparency in judicial analysis and promote refinements in both our legal theory and canons of interpretation.
II. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND THE SPEECH COMMUNITY
One critique of the use of corpus tools concerns the selection
of the relevant language community. Professor Evan Zoldan, for
example, has asserted that the language of statutes differs in potentially important ways from the language of general corpora
like the COCA, the NOW Corpus, and the Corpus of Historical
American English (COHA). 106 Zoldan suggests that “statutory
language and the language of texts found in a general corpus have
different purposes, audiences, and other linguistic characteristics.” 107 And from that premise he concludes that “[i]t is never appropriate to search for statutory meaning in a general corpus.” 108
Zoldan’s points are echoed to some degree by Professor Anya
Bernstein, who suggests the possible need to identify specialized
speech communities to study—such as the community “directly
affected or addressed by [a] statute.” 109 Bernstein posits that the
relevant language community for the cost-shifting statute at issue
in Taniguchi may not be professional translators and interpreters
but the judges who are charged with shifting costs. 110 And she asserts that African Americans, who are “dramatically overrepresented in drug arrests, convictions, and incarceration,” may be
the relevant speech community for “drug-related criminal and
sentencing statutes.” 111
We agree with elements of the above premises. But we think
the criticism is substantially overstated. And we think that the
arguments about language community ultimately reinforce rather than undermine the need for and utility of corpus linguistic
analysis.

106
107
108
109
110
111

See Zoldan, supra note 15, at 423–41.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 438.
See Bernstein, supra note 15, at 459.
Id. (citing Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 576–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
Id.
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The Purpose of Legal Language

We agree that “statutory language serves different purposes
than the language found in the texts of a general corpus.” 112 The
fact that the former is prescriptive—in “prescrib[ing] modes of
conduct, grant[ing] rights, [and] impos[ing] obligations”—could
highlight a significant point of distinction. 113 It may be that the
prescriptive nature of legal language could sometimes call into
question the probity of evidence from a general corpus. Perhaps
we use the terminology of “carry” a firearm differently when we are
prohibiting it in a criminal law establishing a mandatory minimum
sentence than we do when we are merely speaking descriptively.
And if so, that could call into question the utility of a general corpus for assessing the meaning of the language of this statute.
Yet that premise does not render corpus linguistic analysis
untenable. Zoldan and Bernstein offer no alternative mechanism
for assessing the communicative content of the language of law.
This project, as noted, is as much about underscoring inadequacies in our existing theories and tools as it is in proposing a range
of new tools. Critics questioning the utility of corpus linguistic
analysis should choose a place on the spectrum of key questions
we raised in Part I—whether they are proposing to abandon the
search for the “standard picture” altogether, to stick with nowdebunked tools for painting that picture (sense-ranking fallacy,
fallacy of etymology, etc.), or to help in the quest for more reliable
tools. 114 Zoldan and Bernstein offer no alternatives. They only
suggest that a general corpus may not be perfect. That may be
true, but it is not enough to justify either the continued use of
more problematic tools or the abandonment of the corpus linguistics project altogether.
That leads to a second response to Zoldan’s point about the
purpose of statutory language: If and when his premise is correct,
it may be tested using the very methods that Zoldan criticizes.
There is nothing about corpus linguistic analysis that limits its
use to a general corpus. BYU Law is in the initial stages of developing a corpus of legislative history. Such a corpus might allow
us to test the premise of Zoldan’s argument. We could look to see
how “carry” a firearm is used in legal language. And we could

Zoldan, supra note 15, at 426.
Id. at 426 & n.158 (third alteration in original) (quoting Andrei Marmor, The Pragmatics of Legal Language, 21 RATIO JURIS 423, 425 (2008)).
114 See supra Part I.A.
112
113
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assemble evidence of whether the use of this term in this context
differs in any meaningful way from its use in a general corpus.
Such analysis, moreover, would give us evidence that could never
be derived from current methods.
B.

The Audience of Legal Language

Zoldan also suggests that legal language is aimed at a different audience. He says that “[t]he audience of statutes always includes experts who interpret statutory language in their official
capacity.” 115 And he notes that general corpora like COCA are
measuring informal language aimed at a different audience, in
that they include transcripts of unscripted conversation from TV
and radio programs, short stories and plays, etc. 116 This premise
is not wrong. But it is overstated. And, again, it fails to undermine
the corpus linguistics project because Zoldan offers no better way
to assess the communicative content of the language of law.
A key problem with this critique is that it sweeps too broadly.
It is surely true that the audience of a statute “always includes
public officials, subject-matter experts, lawyers, and judges” who
will have specialized training about the language of law. 117 But
that doesn’t tell us that this is the only audience at which our laws
are aimed. Much of the criminal and regulatory law of state and
local government is aimed at individuals. This is Bernstein’s
point. In the criminal law we assume that people read the law and
are entitled to regulate their behavior in accordance with its
terms. 118 This may often be a fiction. But it advances a core function of law—a notice function, which is aimed at avoiding unfair
surprise, or upsetting settled reliance interests. 119
This helps to highlight a central point we have been making
all along—that many of the problems we encounter in the law and
corpus linguistics movement are rooted in imprecisions in legal
theory, not in problems with corpus linguistics. What Zoldan has
done is to take a position on an unsettled question of legal theory—
inadvertently emphasizing the need to be clear about the nature
of meaning that the law is trying to measure. There may be
Zoldan, supra note 15, at 430.
See id.
117 Id. (emphasis added).
118 See McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931) (Holmes, J.) (“[I]t is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world
will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.”).
119 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 818 & n.131.
115
116
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reasons (rooted in the goals of advancing the coherence of the
broader fabric of the law) for crediting specialized legal meaning
in the words of our law. But there are also strong arguments in
favor of a search for ordinary meaning. At least sometimes, moreover, the concepts will overlap. Zoldan has failed to identify any
examples of cases in which he thinks the audience problem would
distort the utility of corpus linguistic analysis. We see no reason
to doubt the utility of our corpus analysis of “carry” a firearm, or
“harbor” an alien, especially since these cases involve criminal
laws where concerns for fair notice call for application of the rule
of lenity. And Zoldan has offered no better way to assess the
meaning of language within the specialized community that he
imagines.
Again, this highlights a feature—not a bug—of corpus linguistic analysis. To the extent the language of law is specialized, we
can build a specialized corpus to assess its meaning. If “carry” a
firearm has a distinct meaning in the dialect of law, we can build
a specialized legal corpus to measure it. So the critique ultimately
comes back as a ground for endorsing (and of course refining) the
corpus linguistic project, not abandoning it.
C.

The Usage and Syntax of Legal Language

Zoldan’s last point is to assert that legal language may differ
from ordinary language in terms of word usage and syntax. He
says that “differences in syntax and drafting conventions [ ] ‘render[ ] legislative texts incomprehensible to all except the specialist reader’” 120 and that “[legal texts] contain ‘word usages that
have no parallel in ordinary conversation.’” 121
Zoldan may be right that a general corpus search could be
unhelpful as to these sorts of phrases and constructions. If a word
or phrase is uncommon or unattested in a general corpus, then of
course a corpus search will not be helpful. But once again, Zoldan
has cited no examples of this in the case studies we have presented. And it doesn’t undermine the general utility of corpus
analysis to suggest that it will not always be useful. Our principal
responses to this critique are made above, but we remind the
reader that our existing tools for assessing ordinary meaning are
120 Zoldan, supra note 15, at 436 (quoting Yon Maley, The Language of Law, in
LANGUAGE AND THE LAW 11, 25 (John Gibbons ed., 1994)).
121 Id. at 435 (quoting Paul E. McGreal, Slighting Context: On the Illogic of Ordinary
Speech in Statutory Interpretation, 52 U. KAN. L. REV. 325, 326 (2004)) (giving as examples
“interplead” and “demurrer”).
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even more problematic and that we can construct corpora to assess the specialized language communities that Zoldan is interested in.
Corpus searches—especially in large corpora—allow the user
to find many examples of comparatively infrequent linguistic phenomena, like “carry” as a verb within so many words of some type
of firearm or gun. Questions like the one raised in Muscarello are
not concerned with the general syntax of the law, but with the
particular syntax of the relevant statute. And in this case, the
NOW Corpus provided many examples of language containing the
relevant information, including the relevant syntax, of the statute. Because these corpora range from hundreds of millions of
words to several billion words, they often provide more than
enough evidence, even if the syntax of a particular clause differs
from how most people speak and write.
III. CORPUS LINGUISTICS AND NOTICE
Another objection to corpus linguistic analysis of the language of the law concerns whether the tool gives fair notice to litigants and legislatures who don’t have access to or knowledge of
corpora and wouldn’t know how to use them if they did. The critics
seem to have two forms of notice in mind: notice of what the law
requires and notice of the methods used by judges to decide their
cases.
Professor Hessick observes that our criminal law in particular “must give us fair notice of what conduct is permitted and
what conduct is prohibited.” 122 And because the average person
“cannot be expected to perform their own corpus searches and
analyses,” Hessick asserts that the public will not have fair notice. 123 With that concern in mind, she warns that a person subject
to criminal liability based on corpus linguistic analysis of a criminal statute “may accidentally engage in illegal conduct,” or “may
choose to avoid large swaths of legal conduct because she does not
know for certain whether such conduct is permitted.” 124
Hessick starts from valid premises—about the importance of
fair notice, and the inability of defendants to perform corpus linguistic analysis on their own. But those premises are hardly

Hessick, supra note 16, at 1514.
Id. at 1515.
124 Id. at 1514–15 (first citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972);
and then citing United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 36 (1963)).
122
123
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enough to undermine the use of this set of tools. Indeed, concerns
about fair notice cut against maintaining the status quo and
strongly in favor of the addition of corpus tools to the judge’s existing toolbox.
The concern about fair notice underpins our attempt to discern the meaning of the language of the law. 125 In fact, this concern drives most any interpretive inquiry—whether textualist,
purposivist, pragmatic, or otherwise—to begin with an attempt to
discern the ordinary or plain meaning of legal language. 126 We
start (and often end) with that inquiry because we think that people are entitled to fair notice of the legal consequences of their
behavior—and because we believe that our shared conventions
about language usage lend more determinacy and predictability
to the inquiry into ordinary meaning than we will find in other
interpretive inquiries. 127
Hessick is also right that most people don’t know how to do
corpus linguistic analysis. But it doesn’t follow that the tools of
this field cannot be used to assess the ordinary meaning of the
language of law. The viability of these tools must turn on whether
they improve the accuracy of the judge’s assessment of that meaning. Our courts use a broad range of tools (canons, legislative history, etc.) that the general public lacks the expertise necessary to
employ on its own. And the viability of those tools has always
turned on whether they accurately assess the public behavior
they purport to measure—not on whether the public has the expertise necessary to employ such tools on their own.
To flesh out this point it may be helpful to distinguish two
categories of factual inquiry performed in our courts. One such
inquiry concerns adjudicative facts. These are facts about the
real-world dispute between the parties to a given case—facts
about what/where/when/how/why that require courts to decide
which side’s view is deemed correct. 128 We would not put up with
a criminal justice system that subjects people to criminal (or even
civil) liability based on factual inquiries that turn on standards
or methods that are opaque, hidden, or inaccessible to the parties.
Transparency and fair notice are crucial. Yet the transparency
See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 818.
See ESKRIDGE, supra note 27, at 34–35.
127 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 792–95.
128 As to these facts, judges concededly are beholden to the evidence presented by the
parties; sua sponte judicial inquiries into adjudicative facts are prohibited. See State v.
Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1284 (Utah 2015) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 868–71.
125
126
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and notice that we require does not turn on a layperson’s ability
to reproduce the means of proving a particular fact; it just turns
on whether those means are shown to be sufficiently reliable in
proving the underlying fact. 129 Where means of proof are inaccessible to parties directly, we expect them to turn to and rely on
experts who can inform them and represent their interests in
court—their counsel and the expert witnesses that their counsel
may employ.
Consider a criminal price-fixing case under antitrust law, 130
or a criminal counterfeiting case under trademark law. 131 A defendant in these cases is entitled to fair notice of the terms and
conditions for proving the facts necessary to establish the elements of the charged crimes. And the law of evidence will dictate
whether a given means of proving those elements is sufficiently
reliable to be admitted into evidence. But we do not require the
defendant himself to be capable of understanding or replicating
the methodology. Instead, we expect him to rely on his own experts. In the criminal antitrust case example, the prosecution
may put on expert testimony from an economist, presenting a
multiple regression analysis supporting an allegation that the defendant exercised market power in setting prices. The defendant
may not be in a position to replicate or even understand the economist’s regression analysis. Yet that would not foreclose the admissibility of this testimony. That would rise or fall on the competency and reliability of the expert analysis; 132 and the defendant
could retain his own expert to challenge it.
The same goes for the trademark case. Here we could expect
the prosecution to call a marketing or consumer behavior expert
to present a consumer survey supporting the allegation that the
defendant’s trademark creates a likelihood of confusion with a
senior trademark. Again, the defendant would likely have no capacity to replicate this sort of evidence. And again, the
129 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593–94 (1993) (establishing
admissibility factors for scientific testimony); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,
147 (1999) (applying Daubert to all expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702).
130 See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (making illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations”).
131 See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (defining federal criminal trademark counterfeiting offenses).
132 See, e.g., In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., 81 F. Supp. 3d 412, 434 (E.D.
Pa. 2015) (“The Court finds Dr. Rausser’s regression sufficiently reliable for purposes of
Daubert. . . . Plaintiffs persuasively note that Dr. Myslinski’s methods for testing Dr.
Rausser’s regression model hardly demonstrate that the model is, as a whole, unreliable
for demonstrating an expected overcharge.”).
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admissibility of the evidence would turn not on that concern but
on whether the expert is competent and the proposed survey is
reliable. 133 The defendant would of course also have access to his
own expert if he wishes to challenge the prosecution’s survey or
present his own countersurvey.
Corpus linguistic analysis goes to a different sort of factual
inquiry—to the relevant legislative facts of the case. These are
facts that inform the court’s understanding of the law that applies
to the resolution of the case. 134 In a common law case, the legislative facts may concern psychological, economic, or sociological materials that inform the court’s decision as to the optimal rule to
adopt in a particular field. 135 In a constitutional case, the legislative facts may encompass a historical inquiry into the original
meaning of a term or clause of the Constitution. 136 On these sorts
of facts we allow and even encourage our judges to perform their
own inquiries. Judges are not limited to the legislative factual
material submitted by the parties or their counsel. 137 They may
perform their own inquiries into relevant social science literature
to determine the best common law rule, just as they may do their
own historical research on the original meaning of the
133 See 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 32:182 (5th ed. 2020).
134 See Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1284 & n.36 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Bulova Watch Co. v. K. Hattori & Co., 508 F. Supp. 1322,
1328 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (explaining that the “court’s power to resort to less well known and
accepted sources of data to fill in the gaps of its knowledge for legislative and general
evidential hypothesis purposes must be accepted because it is essential to the judicial process”); Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 868–71 (discussing
how corpus linguistic tools are used to assess and determine legislative, rather than adjudicative facts); ROBERT E. KEETON, JUDGING 38–39 (1990) (clarifying the distinction between
legislative and adjudicative facts).
135 See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 871 n.316
(listing examples); Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1276–77, 1277 nn.14–16 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (discussing examples).
136 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2056–57 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (interpreting “Officers of the United States”); see also Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 264–71
(describing several examples).
137 See Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1284 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); see also Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at
869–70; Kenneth Culp Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364, 402–03 (1942):

When an agency wrestles with a question of law or policy, it is acting legislatively,
just as judges have created the common law through judicial legislation, and the
facts which inform its legislative judgment may conveniently be denominated legislative facts. The distinction is important; the traditional rules of evidence are
designed for adjudicative facts, and unnecessary confusion results from attempting to apply the traditional rules to legislative facts.
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Constitution. The same goes for our judges’ inquiries into the ordinary meaning of the language of the law. They are not stuck
with the dictionaries or other materials cited by the parties; we
expect them to use their best lights and the most reliable tools to
assess the meaning of legal language. 138
This is not to say that “anything goes” when it comes to the
inquiry into legislative facts. We expect both parties and judges
alike to utilize competent methods and tools and to present reliable, probative evidence in support of their positions on these facts.
And although a judge is entitled to perform his own inquiry and
present his own evidence, most judges will prefer to have adversary briefing before relying on a new line of inquiry (such as corpus linguistic analysis). 139 Ultimately, however, we judge the competence of the methods and tools and the reliability of the
evidence on the basis of their ability to accurately inform the
court’s determination of the legislative fact in question—and not
on whether a party to the case could himself replicate the process
leading to the court’s determination. As with adjudicative facts,
we understand that a lay party may lack the knowledge or expertise to perform a given factual inquiry; but we fall back on the
assurance that the inquiry itself is reliable and that the defendant can retain his own expert to perform his own analysis of the
issue.
Average criminal defendants may lack knowledge of the social
science methods or literature of relevance to the court’s determination of the appropriate common law standard or defense to apply in a given case, just as they may be out of their depth on the
tools or methods for assessing the original meaning of the Double
Jeopardy Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause in a case where
those provisions may provide a defense. But we do not foreclose a
court from employing these tools for determining the content of
the law on this basis. We allow defendants to acquire the expertise they may need through counsel and expert witnesses.
For all these reasons, the viability of corpus linguistic analysis
of the language of the law must turn on the reliability of these
tools for assessing ordinary meaning. And a core premise of the
corpus linguistics movement in law is the notion that our
138 See Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1276–77 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note
7, at 869–71.
139 See Rasabout, 356 P.3d at 1283 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (“Our opinions are better when adversary briefing is complete and in-depth.”).
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traditional tools for assessing ordinary meaning—judicial intuition, dictionaries, etymology, and canons—are demonstrably inadequate. The first two of these listed tools are usually just smoke
screens. Judges cite them as dispositive, but they usually don’t
give a reliable indication of which of two proffered senses of a statutory term is more ordinary. 140 Hessick and other critics do not
address with this problem. They certainly don’t defend the reliability of these tools. And without an answer to this problem, they
are effectively arguing in favor of judicial reliance on tools that
are clearly incapable of providing a reliable answer to the ordinary meaning inquiry. If notice is the concern, this prospect ought
to be much worse. One of the motivating concerns behind the corpus linguistics project is the need for greater transparency, and
the avoidance of tools that can mask and facilitate confirmation
bias and motivated reasoning. 141 When judges are allowed to justify their answers to questions about legislative facts with malleable tools that don’t really provide an answer, they are certain to
undermine the goal of fair notice. Corpus linguistic tools are
aimed at minimizing this risk. To the extent they accurately inform the inquiry into the ordinary meaning of the language of the
law, they enhance rather than undermine the goal of promoting
fair notice to the public. And for reasons explored above and in
our prior writings we are confident that these tools do in fact improve the accuracy of this judicial inquiry.
That leaves the use of judicial intuition. We are quite in favor
of the use of this tool. We just think that intuition about linguistic
facts, unchecked by evidence, runs the risks (if not the guarantee)
of confirmation bias and motivated reasoning. And again, these
140 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 808–09 (arguing that relying on the ordering of definitions in a dictionary to determine the sense of the
word used in a given context is often problematic because “[t]he dictionaries typically cited
by our courts . . . make no claims about the relative frequency of the listed senses of a
given word”); id. at 809–10 (describing the “etymological fallacy” as the assumption that
a word’s etymology reveals the word’s true meaning in a given context (quoting HENRY
SWEET, THE PRACTICAL STUDY OF LANGUAGES: A GUIDE FOR TEACHERS AND LEARNERS 88
(1900))); Lee & Phillips, supra note 8, at 283 (noting that “because the human brain understands words not in isolation but in their broader semantic (and pragmatic) context,
we may often miss the import of a given constitutional term if we just separately look up
its component words in the dictionary”).
141 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 877:

At a minimum, the data that can be compiled through corpus linguistic analysis
will allow lawyers and judges to have a transparent debate informed by real data
instead of inferences from sources (like dictionaries or etymology or intuition)
that are both opaque and ill-suited to the task to which they are applied.
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are the very risks that a proponent of fair notice ought to be interested in avoiding.
On this point (as with every other argument addressed
herein) our critics fall short in their failure to back up their criticism with a defense of the status quo. A central part of the law
and corpus linguistic thesis is its challenge to the viability of traditional tools for assessing ordinary meaning. And, unless our
critics can show that the status quo is better at protecting their
concerns about fair notice, they have failed to counter a central
element of the project. Indeed, if fair notice about judicial tools for
assessing ordinary meaning is the concern, then the status quo is
the approach that ought to cause the most heartburn. A party to
a judicial proceeding may not be able to anticipate the linguistic
intuitions of the individual judge or panel of judges that will decide their case. So if the inaccessibility of a decisive interpretive
methodology is a sticking point on fair notice grounds, then the
bare use of judicial intuition (unchecked by any evidence) is the
worst approach we could possibly imagine.
Hessick misstates the premises of the corpus linguistic inquiry. She accuses us of “[s]eeking to prevent judges from relying
on their own judgment in statutory interpretation,” in a manner
that ultimately “reject[s] [ ] the judicial power to interpret the
laws.” 142 Professor Bernstein advances a similar charge. She says
that corpus linguistic analysis improperly “outsourc[es] interpretation,” giving the “impression of certainty” but “actually undermin[ing] . . . the discretion we thrust on [judges].” 143 Both of these
criticisms are mistaken. As discussed in more detail below, the
corpus linguistics project has never been about eliminating judicial discretion. The only discretion we wish to limit is the discretion to make claims about language usage based on the single
data point of a judge’s “take my word for it” assurance—an assurance unsupported by (and at times directly contradicted by) evidence from a tool specifically designed to measure language usage.
We do not disagree with Bernstein’s observations about the
discretion that remains in a judge’s use of corpus linguistic evidence. To use such evidence reliably and appropriately, a judge
must be informed of the premises of this corpus linguistic inquiry
and exercise the judgment necessary to separate reliable corpus
linguistic analysis from junk science. We concede that more work

142
143

Hessick, supra note 16, at 1512.
Bernstein, supra note 15, at 439.
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needs to be done to refine the proper terms and conditions for corpus analysis of the language of the law. But that concession does
not undermine the basis for the project.
IV. SURVEY-BASED CRITIQUES OF THE ACCURACY OF CORPUS
LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS
Recent criticisms of corpus linguistic analysis also question
whether corpus tools yield an accurate measure of the ordinary
understanding of statutory language. A prominent example of
this work is Professor Tobia’s recent article in the Harvard Law
Review. 144 Tobia tests the performance of survey respondents on
a series of interpretive tasks. Some of the respondents were
asked to respond based on their own intuitive concept of a given
question. Others were either given dictionary definitions or corpus evidence. 145 Because respondents who made concept-based
judgments about the scope of tested terms responded differently
than those who were given dictionary definitions and corpus evidence, Tobia concludes that the corpus-based (and dictionarybased) analysis must be in “error” 146 and “inconsistent with ordinary meaning.” 147
Tobia states that “dictionary use and legal corpus linguistics
carry serious risks of diverging from ordinary understanding.” 148
He also concludes that the results of his experiments “shift the
argumentative burden to theorists and practitioners who rely on
these tools to determine legal outcomes: in light of the data, these
views must articulate and demonstrate a nonarbitrary and reliable method of interpretation.” 149
Tobia’s thesis is premised on a series of surveys administered
to judges, law students, and, primarily, respondents recruited from
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. 150 The surveys addressed the meaning
of several statutory terms. But here we will focus on Tobia’s surveys of the scope of the term “vehicle.”
Tobia’s experiment proceeded in four parts. In the first part,
he conducted surveys assessing the meaning of the term “vehicle”
under three separate conditions—a concept condition, a
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

See generally Tobia, supra note 17.
Id. at 754–56.
Id. at 772–74.
Id. at 749 tbl.1, 772.
Id. at 805.
Tobia, supra note 17, at 805.
Id. at 754, 763, 765.
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dictionary condition, and a corpus condition. 151 In the concept condition, Tobia’s respondents were asked to respond to a series of
questions about whether a given noun (car, bus, truck, bicycle,
airplane, toy car, etc.) is properly classified as a “vehicle.” 152
Tobia’s dictionary and corpus condition surveys took a somewhat different approach. Instead of asking survey respondents to
say whether a given noun is properly classified as a “vehicle,” Tobia
introduced a dummy replacement word (“ailac”), asserting that
the use of such a placeholder would prevent respondents from
having any associations with the term “vehicle” that would interfere with their use of the dictionary and ensure that the responses
were attributable to the dictionary prompts, rather than their
“conceptual competence concerning vehicles.” 153
In the dictionary condition, participants were given a set of
dictionary definitions defining “ailac” as “1) a means of carrying
or transporting something” and “2) an agent of transmission: carrier.” 154 Respondents were then asked to characterize ten items
(vehicle, automobile, car, bus, truck, bicycle, airplane, ambulance,
golf cart, and toy car), responding to question prompts like: “‘Is a
car an ailac?’ [Yes / No].” 155
In the corpus condition, Tobia attempted to model the use of
linguistic corpora in legal interpretation. Participants in the corpus condition were prompted to “[c]onsider the noun, ‘ailac’” and
given “some information” about the term to help them “understand” it. 156 First, he gave respondents “the top common words
used in connection with ‘ailac’”—words that “might appear before

Id. at 754–56.
Id. at 754–55, 757 fig.1. Tobia speaks of a range of examples for this term in the
language of law: an insurance policy covering all vehicles owned by an insured, a state
statute requiring registration of all vehicles, and a local ordinance prohibiting vehicles in
public parks. See id. at 739–40. But despite acknowledging the different context that each
of these applications would introduce, Tobia does not seek to consider the context differences in any of his surveys. We take this point up further below.
153 Id. at 755–56.
154 Tobia, supra note 17, at 755. Notably, Tobia gave his survey respondents broad,
extensive definitions of “vehicle”—the notions of “a means of carrying or transporting
something” and of “an agent of transmission: carrier.” He also claims that “this dictionary
definition” is the one we “suggested” in our article. Id. at 755 n.134. This is incorrect. We
identified a much wider range of definitions, including a more limited one referring to an
automobile. See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 800–02.
And Tobia’s choice of definition skewed his results in a predictable way that renders his
survey uninteresting and his results unhelpful. We discuss this problem further below.
155 Tobia, supra note 17, at 756 (brackets in original).
156 Id. at 755.
151
152
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or after ailac, or sometimes close to ailac.” 157 He then showed respondents a collection of approximately fifty collocates or “[t]op
common words” purportedly associated with “ailac,” though they
were in fact collocates of “vehicle.” 158
Next, Tobia showed respondents a collection of nine concordance lines featuring the word “ailac.” 159 Tobia characterizes these
survey prompts as “precisely what recent advocates of legal corpus linguistics recommend.” 160 As with the dictionary condition,
respondents were asked to characterize ten items responding to
question prompts like: “‘Is a car an ailac?’ [Yes / No].” 161
In a second experiment, Tobia administered a different survey to respondents recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. In
this survey, Tobia explained to respondents “the difference between prototypical and nonprototypical category members,” and
then asked them to answer the following prompts for the same
ten items as in the first experiment:
An airplane is a prototypical vehicle. 1 (strongly disagree) to
7 (strongly agree)
An airplane is technically a vehicle. 1 (strongly disagree) to 7
(strongly agree). 162
In light of the results of his first and second experiments, Tobia concludes, among other things, that “corpus linguistics elicits
more prototypical uses of a term[,] but dictionaries elicit more extensive uses.” 163
In a third experiment, Tobia repeated the first experiment
with minor changes, 164 only this time his respondents were a collection of ninety-six state and federal judges who agreed to

157

Id.
Id. These were: “electric, motor, plug-in, unmanned, armored, connected, cars,
aerial, charging, pure, launch, owners, hybrid, traffic, fuel, driving, gas, autonomous,
struck, operating, road, safety, accidents, battery, ownership, emergency, batteries,
emissions, seat, advanced, driver, primary, demand, commandeered, fuel-efficient, automakers, demonstrators, excluding, lunar, passenger, fleet, gasoline, luxury, drove,
parking, retirement, [and] infrastructure.” Id. at 755–56 (emphasis omitted).
159 Id. at 756 & n.137.
160 Tobia, supra note 17, at 756 (emphasis in original) (citing Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 840–42).
161 Id. (brackets in original).
162 See id. at 759.
163 Id. at 761.
164 Here, Tobia asked about twenty-five entities instead of ten entities, including
some that he predicted would not be viewed as “vehicles.” See id. at 762.
158
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respond to a survey. 165 He finds that the responses of state and
federal judges are “strikingly similar” to those of “nonexpert[ ]”
respondents, and also that the “judges’ use of legal corpus linguistics and dictionary methods did not consistently reflect their ordinary judgments about category membership.” 166
Lastly, Tobia conducted a fourth experiment in which he administered surveys similar to those in the first experiment, but this
time assessing “vehicle” and nine additional terms. 167 The additional tested terms were: carry, interpreter, labor, tangible object,
weapon, animal, clothing, food, and furniture. 168
Tobia says that the data from these experiments show “significant differences among Dictionary, Legal Corpus Linguistics,
and Concept conditions.” 169 He questions the use of both dictionaries and corpus tools for assessing ordinary meaning, asserting
that both approaches yield responses that are inconsistent with
the results of his concept condition surveys. 170 And he thus asserts
that both are problematic tools for accurately assessing ordinary
meaning. 171
Tobia is particularly critical of corpus tools. He says that
“[b]roadly speaking, dictionary use was fairly consistent with
people’s ordinary judgments,” in that “cars, buses, and trucks
are vehicles, but a toy car definitely is not.” 172 Yet he concludes
that “corpus linguistics did not perform nearly as well,” asserting
that “[a] bus is seemingly within our modern conception of a vehicle, but only half of the users of legal corpus linguistics made
that categorization.” 173 Later, however, Tobia also raises concerns
165 See Tobia, supra note 17, at 763. Tobia also administered the first survey to law
students at Harvard, Columbia, and Yale. See id. at 762. The results are presented in
Appendix C to Tobia’s article and included in some charts, but not discussed in detail in
the main body. See id.; see, e.g., id. at 766 fig.5. This Article will primarily address the
discussion in the main body of Tobia’s piece.
166 Id. at 764.
167 Id.
168 See id. As in the third experiment, Tobia asked survey respondents about twentyfive separate entities for each term. In addition, rather than look for definitions in the
dictionaries cited in Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, as in the
first experiment, Tobia relied on the first full definition of the relevant term from MerriamWebster.com. See id. at 764–65. It is not clear why Tobia elected to use only the first definition. Here again, Tobia finds a large degree of divergence in responses to his Concept,
Dictionary, and Corpus conditions. Id. at 765.
169 Tobia, supra note 17, at 756; see id. at 764–65.
170 See id. at 772–73.
171 See id.
172 Id. at 757.
173 Id. (emphasis in original).
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about dictionary usage. He asserts that “in some cases the dictionary use indicated that clear nonvehicles were, in fact, vehicles”—noting that “dictionary-using judges overrated roller
skates and baby-shoulder carriers as vehicles, compared to
judges’ ordinary evaluation of those entities.” 174
Tobia makes some provocative points. We are open to the possibility that survey tools may hold some promise in introducing
an additional set of empirical data for assessing the ordinary
meaning of statutory text. And we welcome Tobia’s contribution
to the dialogue about how best to assemble empirical data in this
budding field. That said, we see flaws in the methods and premises of Tobia’s analysis. So, although we think he raises some crucial questions that merit further exploration, we don’t think he
delivers defensible answers to his own questions. And we don’t
think his surveys establish the ground truth by which the “accuracy” of corpus tools for discerning the ordinary meaning of legal
language can be measured.
Our response proceeds in two main parts. In Part IV.A, we
address the threshold premise of Tobia’s accuracy claim—his assertion that the baseline truth of ordinary meaning is established
by the results of his concept condition survey. We identify a range
of reasons to question this premise, highlighting shortcomings in
Tobia’s survey design and in survey methods generally. In
Part IV.B, we respond to the specific charge that corpus measures
are biased in a particular way. Again, we highlight problems in
Tobia’s measures. But we also show how the careful corpus
methods that we have advocated can account for the concerns
that Tobia has raised.
A.

Tobia’s Concept Condition Results Do Not Establish
Baseline Truth

Tobia assumes, without establishing, that his concept condition survey results are an accurate depiction of human perception
of ordinary meaning. But his assumption falters on each of three
grounds: (1) Tobia adopts an implicit preference for linguistic
competence over linguistic performance, even though his choice
introduces a range of concerns for which he has not accounted.
(2) He ignores the nuance and complexity embedded in the legal
notion of ordinary meaning, which renders his data unhelpful.
(3) Human perception of language is informed by both syntactic
174

Tobia, supra note 17, at 773.
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and pragmatic context but is excluded from Tobia’s oversimplified
concept condition experiment (while such context may be incorporated into corpus linguistic analysis).
1. Survey methods do not give privileged access to
linguistic “competence.”
A threshold problem with Tobia’s survey analysis is definitional. Tobia repeatedly uses the phrases “ordinary understanding” and “ordinary judgments.” 175 He never defines these terms. 176
But he seems to equate them with the results of his concept condition surveys. 177 So when Tobia says that “both legal corpus linguistics and dictionary use diverged from [the] ordinary meaning”
of the tested term or phrase, 178 all he is saying is that the results
of his dictionary- and corpus-based surveys diverged from the results of his concept-based survey. 179 And when he states that the
“judges’ use of legal corpus linguistics and dictionary methods did
not consistently reflect their ordinary judgments about category
membership,” 180 all he is saying is that the results of dictionaryand corpus-based surveys diverged from the results of his concept-based survey. The divergence in the survey results across the
three conditions is thus the basis for Tobia’s conclusion that corpus linguistic tools cannot accurately assess “ordinary understanding” or “ordinary meaning.” 181
While Tobia doesn’t define what he means by ordinary understanding, he does quote Justice Holmes for the proposition that,
in construing a legal text, “we ask, not what this man meant, but
what those words would mean in the mouth of a normal speaker
of English,” and that words are used “in the sense in which they
would be used by the normal speaker of English.” 182 Justice
Holmes also said that “[w]hen a rule of conduct is laid down in
words that evoke [a picture] in the common mind,” the proper
See, e.g., id. at 739, 753.
Tobia does appear to provide a definition of the related term “ordinary meaning,”
stating that “ordinary meaning is generally informed by considerations of how readers of
the text would actually understand it.” Id. at 739 (emphasis in original).
177 See id. at 754 (“[C]oncept participants received no information so that they would
rely on their ordinary understanding.”).
178 Id. at 735.
179 See Tobia, supra note 17, at 772–73.
180 Id. at 764.
181 Id. at 805.
182 Id. at 736–37 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417, 419–20 (1899)).
175
176
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interpretation of the legal text should be consistent with that picture. 183 Tobia seems to suggest that the survey methods he employs give us privileged access to the picture that is elicited in the
mind by the words of a statute—access that cannot be obtained
through linguistic corpora.
Though Tobia doesn’t define what he means by “ordinary understanding,” a possible framing might turn on the distinction between linguistic “competence” and linguistic “performance.” In
his influential work Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Professor
Noam Chomsky distinguishes between linguistic competence,
which is “the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of his language,” and
performance, which is “the “actual use of language in concrete situations.” 184 Competence is thus the unconscious, internal
knowledge of language, while performance reflects the actual,
real-world use of language by speakers and writers.
It is possible to view corpus analysis as aimed at uncovering
evidence of performance, while surveys could be viewed as producing evidence of competence. But this view is problematic for
reasons explained below, and it is one that Chomsky would flatly
reject. Chomsky made clear that he viewed the speaker-hearer’s
competence as “neither presented for direct observation nor extractable from data by inductive procedures of any known sort.” 185
Survey responses do not present a direct window into the linguistic perceptions of survey respondents. And they do not give
us direct evidence of Chomskyan competence. Like corpora, they
provide indirect evidence of linguistic perception, use, and
knowledge. In Chomskyan terms, survey responses, like corpus
evidence, are just another type of performance.
Tobia does not reference Chomsky’s Aspects of the Theory of
Syntax, nor does he make explicit claims about performance or
competence. But Tobia does argue that ordinary meaning is a
search for “ordinary people’s understanding of legal texts.” 186
When presented with a divergence between his corpus-based survey and his concept-based survey, Tobia concludes that the corpusbased survey is in error. The implication is that when conclusions
based on an examination of usage evidence diverge from direct
questioning about concepts, it is the response to direct questioning
that best reflects “ordinary understanding.”
183
184
185
186

McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25, 27 (1931).
NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 4 (1965).
Id. at 18.
Tobia, supra note 17, at 736 (emphasis omitted).
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This is problematic. A significant body of research calls into
question the reliability of self-reported linguistic judgments and
behaviors and the proposition that natural linguistic behaviors
can ever be elicited in artificial linguistic settings like interviews
and surveys. In circumstances where linguists employ interview
or survey methods to elicit linguistic behavior, they take great
pains in study design to avoid observer effects and create naturalistic linguistic settings. Tobia does not appear to have taken
any such steps in his survey design. He has not cited anything
from a large body of social science literature on the use of survey
responses to elicit judgments about meaning and usage. And his
concept condition results are questionable due to his failure to
consider this literature.
The literature identifies at least three categories of problems
with Tobia’s reliance on his survey evidence: (a) survey respondents cannot be expected to accurately self-report their own linguistic performance and perceptions, (b) natural linguistic behavior cannot reliably be observed in artificial linguistic settings,
(c) the survey methods described by Tobia are not designed to
elicit responses that are consistent with natural language use.
a) Self-reporting problems. Tobia’s concept condition survey
results closely resemble experiments measuring respondents’
judgments about the grammaticality or acceptability of a given
utterance. Indeed, Tobia often uses the phrase “ordinary judgments” to describe the results of his concept-based survey. 187 The
use of grammaticality judgment surveys was once widespread
in linguistics. Linguists interested in trying to examine the
Chomskyan notion of linguistic competence would seek to elicit
such judgments from test subjects and survey respondents.
In recent decades, however, this approach to the study of language has been called into question. 188 Linguists have grown

E.g., id. at 752.
See, e.g., WAYNE COWART, EXPERIMENTAL SYNTAX: APPLYING OBJECTIVE
METHODS TO SENTENCE JUDGMENTS 2 (1997) (“[T]here have been continuing doubts about
the empirical reliability and theoretical interpretation of judgment data as well as questions about what constitutes an appropriate technique for gathering judgment data. . . .
[A]uthors have alleged that judgments are gravely compromised by instability of several
different kinds.”); Kathryn Bock, Language Production: Methods and Methodologies, 3
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 395, 396 (1996):
187
188

The assumption is that the properties of a stimulus’s mental representation are
transparently reflected in the verbal response to the stimulus. This assumption
in turn motivates an erroneous supposition that is pervasive in the literature:
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concerned with the notion that responding to a survey question
about grammaticality may involve entirely different cognitive
processes from that of ordinary communication. Put simply, when
survey respondents are asked for their judgments about language, they are not performing a natural language task. They are
responding to an experiment in an experimental setting. 189 The
introspection and inferential reasoning involved in responding to a
linguistic prompt, and offering a linguistic judgment, are not the
same cognitive task as simply engaging in communication. Thus,
“[p]erformance in an experiment, including performance on the
standard linguistic task of making grammaticality judgments, cannot be equated with grammatical knowledge. To determine properties of the underlying knowledge system requires inferential
reasoning, sometimes of a highly abstract sort.” 190 Grammaticality
judgments are sometimes said to be unreliable because of their “unavoidable meta-cognitive overtones,” 191 that is, they involve cognitive processes that are not part of ordinary communication. For
these reasons, “there have been continuing doubts about the empirical reliability and theoretical interpretation of judgment data.” 192
In fact, one reason given for skepticism about survey evidence
of grammaticality judgments is that they do not match up with
usage evidence from linguistic corpora:
Theoretical linguistics traditionally relies on linguistic intuitions such as grammaticality judgments for data. But the
massive growth of language technologies has made the spontaneous use of language in natural settings a rich and easily
What one says, how one says it, and how long it takes to say it are unsullied
reflections of input processing and interpretation.
See also Hiroshi Nagata, The Relativity of Linguistic Intuition: The Effect of Repetition on
Grammaticality Judgments, 17 J. PSYCHOLINGUISTIC RSCH. 1, 3 (1988) (“[S]tudies suggest
that grammaticality judgments of sentences are not always invariant but are variable depending on the conditions according to which the sentences are judged.”).
189 See CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: GRAMMATICALITY
JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC METHODOLOGY 13 (Language Science Press, 2d ed. 2016)
(“[C]ountless studies [ ] have demonstrated that grammaticality judgments are susceptible
to order and context effects, handedness differences, etc., and have then concluded . . . that
the grammar itself must have these properties. . . . Such conclusions are not justified.”).
190 Jane Grimshaw & Sara Thomas Rosen, Knowledge and Obedience: The Developmental Status of the Binding Theory, 21 LINGUISTIC INQUIRY 187, 188 (1990) (emphasis
added).
191 Shimon Edelman & Morten H. Christiansen, How Seriously Should We Take Minimalist Syntax?, 7 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCIS. 60, 60 (2003) (citing CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE
EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: GRAMMATICALITY JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC
METHODOLOGY (1996)).
192 COWART, supra note 188, at 2.
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accessible alternative source of data. Moreover, studies of usage as well as intuitive judgments have shown that linguistic
intuitions of grammaticality are deeply flawed. 193
That is, where corpus evidence and survey evidence diverge,
many linguists express skepticism of the survey, rather than the
corpus, because the corpus is a record of natural language, while
the survey is a record of “highly abstract” “inferential reasoning” 194 with “meta-cognitive overtones.” 195
We do not mean to suggest that asking for linguistic judgments of survey respondents cannot be useful. Survey evidence is
a measure of linguistic performance. But an examination of performance evidence is just one indirect method of trying to understand actual linguistic perception and usage. Yet surveys and
elicited language judgments are not a privileged window into the
workings of the mind. Where survey evidence and corpus evidence
conflict, at a minimum it is not obvious that survey evidence
should be preferred.
b) Natural language versus unnatural language. A second
problem arises with Tobia’s assumption that surveys report natural linguistic behavior. Survey respondents are not engaged in
natural linguistic communication, and a survey response is not a
natural linguistic behavior. As foreshadowed above, responding
to an artificial linguistic prompt in a survey may involve a different type of cognition than the type involved in ordinary communication. Survey respondents know that they are taking part in a
survey, and that their responses are being observed and subjected
to analysis. This fact alone may cause respondents to deviate from
their natural linguistic behavior.
Corpus linguistics is one method of gathering evidence about
language. One of the advantages of corpus linguistics is that linguistic corpora are designed to represent natural language use in
natural linguistic settings. That is, linguistic corpora are large
electronic collections of natural language—language that was
produced in a natural linguistic setting and during ordinary communication (like reading and writing, or speaking and hearing).
193 Joan Bresnan, Is Syntactic Knowledge Probabilistic? Experiments with the English
Dative Alternation, in ROOTS: LINGUISTICS IN SEARCH OF ITS EVIDENTIAL BASE, SERIES 75,
75 (Sam Featherston & Wolfgang Sternefeld eds., 2007).
194 Grimshaw & Rosen, supra note 190, at 188.
195 Edelman & Christiansen, supra note 191, at 60 (citing CARSON T. SCHÜTZE, THE
EMPIRICAL BASE OF LINGUISTICS: GRAMMATICALITY JUDGMENTS AND LINGUISTIC
METHODOLOGY (1996)).
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Most corpora are not composed of language that was elicited or
recorded specifically for the purpose of study or where the
speaker, hearer, reader, or writer would have been aware that
they were being observed. Corpus linguistics cannot give us access to the picture evoked in the mind of an individual during
communication. But corpus linguistics can give us a lot of evidence of the linguistic output of that mind in natural linguistic
settings. 196 The black box of the mind cannot be directly observed,
and we can learn a lot about language and meaning through indirect observation—by making observations about the mind’s linguistic output.
Tobia’s article may be taken then as an attempt to validate or
invalidate language claims based on evidence of natural language
(i.e., corpus evidence) with evidence from unnatural language (i.e.,
language produced in the artificial linguistic environment of a survey response). The point of relying on usage evidence from linguistic corpora (indeed, one of the key tenets of corpus linguistics) is
that the researcher has access to natural, unobserved (and therefore less tainted) language use from natural linguistic environments. We think that relying on survey responses as a proxy for
ordinary understanding ignores a whole host of challenges that
Tobia fails to address.
Survey responses may not reflect the actual linguistic perceptions or performance of survey respondents. “Even the best designed elicitation tasks are removed from how people use (and
think about) language in everyday life, and people’s reports of
their linguistic usage may or may not match up with what they
actually do.” 197 Surveys “can induce respondents to claim
knowledge and use of features they have never heard prior to the
research situation.” 198 Survey respondents can very easily confound grammaticality with acceptability or correctness. 199 And
survey respondents may be influenced by “ordering effects, participants’ possible discomfort with the test-like nature of the elicitation task, and their resulting desire either to do ‘well’ on the
test” by providing the answers they perceive the test
196 See Svenja Adolphs & Phoebe M.S. Lin, Corpus Linguistics, in THE ROUTLEDGE
HANDBOOK OF APPLIED LINGUISTICS 597, 597 (James Simpson ed., 2011) (“At the heart of
empirically based linguistics and data-driven description of language, corpus linguistics is
concerned with language use in real contexts.”).
197 Natalie Schilling, Surveys and Interviews, in RESEARCH METHODS IN LINGUISTICS
96, 102 (Robert J. Podesva & Devyani Sharma eds., 2013).
198 Id.
199 See id. at 102–03.
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administrator “expects” or “to get the test over with as quickly as
possible.” 200 In addition,
The traditional method of eliciting language attitudes is
plagued by the same problems as elicitations of speech production. The tasks are unnatural, and there is no guarantee that
the results are reflective of listeners’ genuine attitudes. . . .
This may be because listeners do not have free access to
their attitudes or the ability to accurately convey them, or
because they do not wish to express negative attitudes they
might really hold. 201
If the test for ordinary meaning is the picture that is elicited in
the common mind by the words of the legal text, it is not at all
clear that survey evidence will give us a higher resolution of that
picture than corpus linguistics will.
c) Survey design and observer effects. One obvious response
to these objections to survey evidence is that linguists, like other
social scientists, frequently rely on surveys to study language and
meaning. Yet linguists have recognized the problems inherent in
relying on survey evidence to study linguistic behavior. And they
have devised a number of methods for mitigating observer effects
and eliciting natural language. Tobia does not appear to have employed any of these techniques.
Survey methods suffer from what sociolinguist William
Labov referred to as “the Observer’s Paradox: the aim of linguistic
research in the community must be to find out how people talk
when they are not being systematically observed; yet we can only
obtain these data by systematic observation.” 202 If we are aiming
to understand natural language use or natural language perception (i.e., ordinary understanding), then unnatural language produced in an artificial setting may not be satisfactory. 203
Labov proposed that “[o]ne way of overcoming the paradox is
to break through the constraints of the interview situation by

Id. at 103.
Id. at 106.
202 WILLIAM LABOV, SOCIOLINGUISTIC PATTERNS 209 (1972) (emphasis in original).
203 See William Labov, Some Principles of Linguistic Methodology, 1 LANGUAGE SOC’Y
97, 108 (1972) (“In the gathering of elicitations and intuitions, there is no obvious sense in
which the work can be described as valid.” (emphasis in original)); SIDNEY GREENBAUM &
RANDOLPH QUIRK, ELICITATION EXPERIMENTS IN ENGLISH: LINGUISTIC STUDIES IN USE
AND ATTITUDE 7 (1970) (“We are well aware that we cannot escape from the artificiality of
the test situation, though with continuing refinement we can hope to remove some of the
worst effects of bias that the test situation introduces.”).
200
201
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various devices which divert attention away from speech,” so that
“the subject unconsciously assumes that he is not at that moment
being interviewed.” 204 Or, the interviewer can “involve the subject
in questions and topics which recreate strong emotions he has felt
in the past, or involve him in other contexts.” 205 A surveyor may
administer a rapid and anonymous survey, in which relevant
speech is elicited through questions administered before respondents are aware that they are participating in the survey. 206
Even where such mitigating techniques are employed, respondents are typically aware that they are in an unnatural linguistic setting and that their language is being evaluated. 207
Moreover, there is some evidence that when responding to survey
questions, respondents are speaking in an entirely different register from ordinary speech. 208
Whatever the advantages or disadvantages of these mitigation techniques, it is clear that Tobia made no attempt to mitigate
observer effects. Instead, he merely directed responses to questions that were obviously directed at the respondent’s language
judgments, like “‘Is a car an ailac?’ [Yes / No]” or “An airplane is
a prototypical vehicle. 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly
agree).” 209 In such a case, it is not clear that Tobia’s survey responses are representative of the natural language use or perception of his respondents.
2. Tobia’s data are unhelpful given his study design.
Tobia’s survey data also suffer from a second definitional
problem. In his concept condition survey, Tobia asked his respondents to determine whether items on a list of nouns were
properly classified as a “vehicle.” But in so doing Tobia never gave
any indication of how the respondent was to decide on the breadth
of the classification of “vehicle.” In other words, he never defined
“ordinary meaning” for his survey respondents. This left their answers up to their own judgment about the very legal construct he
was trying to measure, robbing the data of any utility.
Tobia’s move ignores the wide range of senses of “ordinary
meaning” that we identified in Judging Ordinary Meaning. Our
204
205
206
207
208
209

LABOV, supra note 202, at 209.
Id.
See Schilling, supra note 197, at 103–04; GREENBAUM & QUIRK, supra note 203, at 7.
See Schilling, supra note 197, at 109.
See id.
Tobia, supra note 17, at 756, 759 (brackets in original).
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article highlighted a problematic imprecision in the law’s search
for ordinary meaning. 210 Citing classic cases on statutory ambiguity, we noted that the range of senses embraced in legal theory
spans a frequency continuum (running from “permissible” senses
of a given term to the “most frequent” or even “exclusive” sense)
and sometimes also sweeps in “prototype” meaning. 211 We also
identified different values or policies that could be viewed to sustain different concepts of ordinary meaning. 212
The foregoing principles were a prelude to our demonstration of the utility of corpus linguistic tools. We noted that the
imprecisions in the attempt to conceptualize ordinary meaning
are wrinkles that need to be ironed out in our legal theory of
interpretation. 213 And we concluded by demonstrating that corpus tools can yield data of relevance to any of the notions of ordinary meaning embraced in the case law. 214 For example, we

210 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 798 (“[I]ronically,
we have no ordinary meaning of ‘ordinary meaning.’”).
211 Id. at 800–01.
212 See, e.g., id. at 859 (emphasis in original):

If we accept the most common use of the word as the ordinary meaning, we can
conclude that the ordinary meaning of vehicle is automobile.
We can also make a strong case for crediting the most common meaning as the
ordinary one, in that it will best avoid unfair surprise (public meaning) and vindicate the presumed intent of the lawmaker (intended meaning). . . . But, as discussed above, that is a question for legal theory.
See also id. at 817–18:
Intended meaning is an appropriate construct to the extent we are aiming to
vindicate the preferences of lawmakers. This is a viable, distinct basis for crediting ordinary meaning. . . .

There is also a case for the public or “reader’s” understanding. This sort of meaning makes sense to the extent we are seeking to vindicate the notice rationale
for the “standard picture”—the protection of reliance interests and the avoidance
of unfair surprise.

213 See id. at 874 (emphasis in original) (quoting Baude & Sachs, supra note 68, at
1089–90):

This raises the question of whether to credit only the top-of-mind sense or a possibly broader, “reflective” sense as ordinary. But this is not a deficiency in corpus
data—or even in linguistic theory. It is a question for law—“we have to decide
which meaning, produced by which theory of meaning, we ought to pick.”
See also id. at 858:
What if our sense of public meaning differs from our sense of intended meaning?
If that happens we would need to decide which data set to rely on. That is a
problem for legal theory—and essentially a choice of which of two sets of justifications for the “standard picture” we seek to vindicate.
214

See, e.g., id. at 858:
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showed how corpus tools could help us determine whether airplanes, bicycles, and automobiles were simply acceptable, common, or prototypical examples of “vehicles.” 215
Tobia skates past all of these nuances. In crediting results
from his concept condition survey, Tobia purports to be establishing a baseline truth about human perception of ordinary meaning. But he nowhere acknowledges the range of possible meanings
of ordinary meaning. And because his survey gave no guidance to
his concept condition respondents, their classifications of various
nouns as falling inside or outside the “vehicle” category are ultimately indecipherable. Without more, we cannot tell whether the
survey respondents are thinking of the question whether a given
item qualifies as a vehicle in terms of the “permissible” sense of
the term or whether they may instead be thinking of it in terms
of a “common,” “most frequent,” or even “prototype” sense.
This is fatal to the utility of Tobia’s inquiry. Even if we assume away the above concerns about the probity of evidence of
language competence, there is no basis in Tobia’s experiment for
his decision to elevate the results of his concept condition survey.
The survey is in this sense a black box. The respondents inside it
could be telling us that a given item counts (or does not count) as
a “vehicle” because they think all permissible senses of vehicle
should be included. Or they could have in mind a different standard for inclusion, based on a “most frequent” sense of “vehicle” or
even a “prototype” sense. We will never know. And without such
knowledge we cannot even begin to have a conversation about
whether the data are conclusive. (It would only be the beginning
of the conversation in any event, as the answer would still depend
on the debatable considerations we highlighted in Judging Ordinary Meaning—as to whether or when each of the various
The speech community question, as we have noted, has implications for the selection of a relevant corpus. If we are trying to measure intended meaning, we
might want to gather data from a corpus of a community of speakers who look
demographically like Congress. Yet if we are interested in public meaning, we
would want to turn to a broader corpus.
215 See, e.g., Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 859 (emphasis in original):

[W]e can conclude that the most common sense of this term is in reference to
automobiles. Airplanes and bicycles appear on our frequency continuum: they
are attested in the data as possible examples of vehicle. But they are unusual—
not the most frequent and not even common. If we accept the most common use
of the word as the ordinary meaning, we can conclude that the ordinary meaning
of vehicle is automobile.
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concepts of ordinary meaning is preferable as a matter of a legal
theory of interpretation.)
For these reasons, Tobia’s analysis is circular. His data show
only that his concept condition respondents classified various entities as a “vehicle” in accordance with their own unstated standard for inclusion. And the data therefore tell us nothing of interest. We cannot begin to have a coherent conversation about
testing ordinary meaning until we define “ordinary meaning.”
And Tobia is in no position to close the debate about the right
measurement tool if he is unwilling to start by defining the standard that he is seeking to operationalize.
Our corpus analysis suffers from no such problems. We identified a range of possible meanings of “ordinary meaning” and
showed how corpus tools can operationalize each of them. Admittedly, we left open the choice among those concepts of ordinary
meaning. But we emphasized that that is a question for our legal
theory of interpretation. And we identified a range of policy considerations that might seem to favor any of a range of these concepts.
We do not mean to dismiss the possibility that survey instruments could add meaningfully to the inquiry into the ordinary
meaning of legal language. 216 But we see substantial barriers to
the utility of the data brought to bear in the Tobia study. 217 And
we think the proponents of surveys must at least define their
terms before they can claim to have identified a baseline truth for
assessing the accuracy of corpus methods.
3. Tobia’s data fail to consider syntactic and pragmatic
context.
Tobia’s survey data also falter in their failure to account for
the range of syntactic and pragmatic context that corpus tools can
incorporate. In Judging Ordinary Meaning, we presented the linguistic basis for the need to assess the ordinary meaning of words
or phrases in light of all their relevant context. 218 We noted that
See id. at 861–62 (discussing the potential of surveys in this enterprise).
See id. at 861 (discussing some “significant barriers to using survey data to address questions of ordinary meaning”).
218 See id. at 816–17 (citations omitted):
216
217

Real human beings do not derive meaning from dictionary definitions and rules
of grammar alone. Everyone takes nonsemantic context—pragmatics—into account in deriving meaning from language. And for that reason we see no basis
to credit semantic meaning without consideration of pragmatic context. If no
lawmaker would read the text that is voted into law purely semantically—devoid
of pragmatic context—then there is no reason to credit that kind of meaning as
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words are not understood in isolation but in context. And we highlighted the salience of both syntactic context 219 (surrounding
words and language structures) and pragmatic context 220 (the
physical or social setting in which the words appear).
These points can be illustrated in the “vehicle” examples
listed in Tobia’s article. Tobia’s survey asks respondents to decide
only whether items in a list of nouns can qualify as a “vehicle.”
No syntactic context or pragmatic context is included—respondents have no sense of whether they are being asked to decide
whether an item counts as the sort of “vehicle” that would be subject, say, to a state vehicle registration law (one of Tobia’s examples), fall within an insurance policy covering all vehicles owned
by an insured (another), or count as a vehicle prohibited by a city
ordinance banning “vehicles in the park” (the classic H.L.A. Hart
problem).
This is problematic. If our human understanding of language
is informed by syntax and pragmatics, we may have a different
understanding of the ordinary meaning of “vehicle” in each of the
three settings noted above. And Tobia’s concept condition survey
makes no attempt to consider this context.
Corpus analysis could easily do so. We could construct a corpus search not just for the noun “vehicle” but for the noun “vehicle” as an object of a human subject who is seeking to “register” it
with a state, or a human subject who is asserting “ownership” in
the context of “insurance.” If the ordinary meaning of “vehicle”
varies depending on this context, we could measure it using the
tools of corpus linguistics. 221 The flexibility of corpus tools, in fact,
is a key selling point for corpus analysis—a point we developed at
great length in Judging Ordinary Meaning. With that in mind, it
is puzzling that Tobia insists on the superiority of his simplistic
survey, which makes no attempt to capture this context or to engage with our defense of corpus methods on this basis.
A survey instrument could of course be devised in a manner
incorporating these elements of context. Instead of just asking a respondent to determine whether or not a given item counts as a
a means of vindicating the intent of a lawmaker. The same goes for the public
governed by the law. If no one reads laws literally by pure semantics, we have
no reason to protect reliance interests or notice concerns rooted in that kind of
understanding.
219
220
221

See id. at 821–22.
See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 823–24.
See id. at 874–75.
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“vehicle” in the abstract, the survey could tell the respondent that
it is inquiring into the scope of a state vehicle registration law or
the coverage of an insurance policy. In expanding the survey in that
way, the context deficiency highlighted here could be addressed.
But that would introduce another set of problems—problems
associated with the difficulty of assembling reliable evidence of
language competence (due to self-reporting problems, unnatural
language issues, and observer effects). These problems can be
magnified when we extend the context given to survey respondents to incorporate pragmatic context. The more context we provide, the less certain we can be that the evidence we are gathering
is telling us anything useful about ordinary language usage. Because survey respondents are humans (with biases and prejudices), their answers at some point will inevitably be more about
preferences for outcomes in anticipated disputes than ordinary
understanding of language usage.
The insurance coverage example highlights the problem. Our
understanding of “vehicle” may well be influenced by the syntactic and pragmatic context of the insurance policy. But if we tell
respondents that they are being asked to decide whether an insurance company should be required to extend insurance coverage to protect a policyholder from harm, that will certainly sway
their answers. For example, as many respondents will be policyholders themselves, they may feel an increased desire to answer
in the affirmative. Such a swayed answer seems unlikely to be
based on perception of language and more likely to be about an
implicit bias against insurance companies.
We are not suggesting that this problem is intractable. Survey instruments could perhaps be designed in a manner that
could control for or otherwise deal with these concerns. But Tobia’s instrument does not do that. And for now we can at least say
that his study falls far short in its attempts to discredit the accuracy of corpus-based analysis. If anything, it highlights the advantages that our proposed tools have over the method he touts
as yielding baseline truth.
***
While neither corpus evidence nor survey evidence provides
a direct window into the natural linguistic behavior or perceptions of language users, both methods can provide useful
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information about language and meaning, even if that information must be dimly viewed through “the performance filter.” 222
We do not mean to suggest that survey methods cannot provide useful evidence of language use and perception. Surveys
have been used since at least the 1800s to gather evidence of language usage. 223 And survey methods have been brought to bear on
topics ranging from language perception and attitudes 224 to language variation. 225 Survey methods also have the advantage that
they are already familiar to lawyers and judges. As noted by Professors Omri Ben-Shahar and Lior Strahilevitz in advocating for
the use of survey methods in contract interpretation: “a large
background of law is already in place making survey wording and
technique in trademark disputes reasonably consistent across
cases,” and “[a] substantial amount of case law exists which provides insight into how to conduct and prepare a trademark survey
that will be admissible in court.” 226 And to the extent that acceptability judgments are relevant to the inquiry of ordinary meaning,
there is at least some evidence that survey methods using the
Amazon Mechanical Turk are at least as good as live surveys in
measuring acceptability judgments of respondents. 227
Yet there are reasons to prefer corpus evidence in some contexts. Linguistic corpora provide evidence of natural language—
language that occurs during ordinary communication and in
natural linguistic settings. Linguistic corpora thus avoid observer effects. The language in the corpus occurred naturally and
was not elicited in an experimental setting. No one was around to
make metalinguistic judgments about the language being used,
and the language in the corpus typically did not involve a subconscious performance for an observer. The corpus allows us to
Grimshaw & Rosen, supra note 190, at 217.
See Schilling, supra note 197, at 97.
224 See generally Kathryn Campbell‐Kibler, Sociolinguistics and Perception, in 4
LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS COMPASS 377 (2010); Jennifer Hay, Paul Warren & Katie
Drager, Factors Influencing Speech Perception in the Context of a Merger-in-Progress, 34
J. PHONETICS 458 (2006).
225 See generally Isabelle Buchstaller & Karen Corrigan, How to Make Intuitions Succeed: Testing Methods for Analysing Syntactic Microvariation, in ANALYSING VARIATION
IN ENGLISH 30 (Warren Maguire & April McMahon eds., 2011).
226 Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior Strahilevitz, Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753, 1774 (2017) (citing Jerre B. Swann, Judge Richard
Posner and Consumer Surveys, 104 TRADEMARK REP. 918, 921 (2014)) (quoting Robert H.
Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based Survey Methods, 4 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 91 (2004)).
227 See Jon Sprouse, A Validation of Amazon Mechanical Turk for the Collection of Acceptability Judgments in Linguistic Theory, 43 BEHAV. RSCH. METHODS 155, 164–66 (2011).
222
223
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examine linguistic production only. Thus, it is difficult to obtain
the “picture” “evoked in the common mind” by the words of a legal
text. 228 But the corpus allows us to see how those words are used
in a similar context, by a similar speech community, and at a similar time. The corpus may still provide indirect evidence of natural language, but it is untarnished by an experimental setting.
Surveys also provide indirect evidence of language use and
perception, but responding to a survey is not a natural linguistic
task—it is an unnatural one. Responses to surveys require a sort
of metalinguistic, inferential cognition that does not form part of
ordinary communication.
Thus, where corpus evidence and survey evidence diverge in
interpretive contexts, it is not obvious that survey evidence
should be preferred. Indeed, if the task is to understand natural
linguistic behavior in natural linguistic settings, then we have
reason to prefer corpus evidence to survey evidence.
B.

Tobia’s Survey Does Not Show That Corpus Tools Are
Biased

Tobia claims that dictionary tools establish what he calls
“more extensive” meaning and that corpus linguistic tools establish
a sort of “prototypical[ ]” meaning. 229 And because corpus linguistic
tools purportedly point only to prototypical meaning, Tobia says
that they lead to the “Nonappearance Fallacy”—the notion that
“any use” of a studied term “that is not reflected” in a corpus “is
therefore not part of the ordinary meaning” of the term. 230 Tobia
also invokes a concept that he thinks of as a related concern—an
“Uncommon Use Fallacy,” or the view (attributed to proponents of
corpus tools) that “the relative rarity of some use in the corpus indicates that this use is outside of the ordinary meaning.” 231
The results of Tobia’s dictionary condition survey flow directly from the study design. Tobia gets extensional “vehicle” data
from his dictionary condition participants because he gives them
only extensional definitions—the “means of carrying or transporting something” and “agent of transmission” definitions. 232 With
these definitions of “ailac” in hand, respondents naturally
McBoyle, 283 U.S. at 27 (alteration omitted).
Tobia, supra note 17, at 766.
230 Id. at 795 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2238–39 (2018)
(Thomas, J., dissenting)).
231 Id. at 796.
232 Id. at 755.
228
229
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conceived of a concept of “vehicle” that is broad and extensional.
We agree that that is problematic. But the problem doesn’t stem
from reliance on dictionaries. It stems from a flawed focus on only
broad, extensional dictionary definitions.
We made this point as to “vehicle” in Judging Ordinary
Meaning. We noted that dictionaries use both extensional definitions (e.g., “carrier,” “agent of transmission”) and more limited
ones that could be examples of a prototype definition (e.g., “automobile”). 233 And we thus concluded that the dictionary cannot answer the problem of lexical ambiguity presented in the “no vehicles in the park” problem. 234 That is the problem with dictionaries.
Tobia also resorts to the “vehicle” example to support his view
that corpus analysis “often neglects nonprototypical uses of a
term.” 235 He notes that the “predominant[ ]” example of “vehicle”
in the corpus is a car. 236 And because he views items like “golf
carts, airplanes, and horse-drawn carriages” as falling “within the
modern ordinary meaning of ‘vehicle,’” he concludes that corpus
analysis is systematically flawed. 237
These claims are not supported by the data presented in
the Tobia article. Tobia’s survey results do not reveal fundamental flaws in the corpus analysis that we have advocated
(and that careful interpreters conduct). They just show that the
flawed use of these tools will produce predictably flawed data.
The Nonappearance Fallacy and Uncommon Use Fallacy, moreover, misstate our position. We have not advocated a use of corpus tools susceptible to Tobia’s criticisms. In fact, corpus tools,
unlike Tobia’s survey, are quite capable of avoiding the fallacies
that Tobia complains about.
That said, Tobia’s critiques help highlight some points of imprecision in our previous articulations of the role of corpus linguistic analysis in legal interpretation. A full response to Tobia’s
analysis requires us to refine our approach—to map out a more
careful framework for assessing corpus data, and to explain how
the data might fit into a broader framework of interpretation.
We elaborate on all of these points below. First, we show that
the supposedly skewed nature of Tobia’s corpus condition results
flows not from a flaw in corpus tools but in the design of Tobia’s
233
234
235
236
237

Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 801–02, 807.
See id. at 807.
Tobia, supra note 17, at 795.
Id.
Id.
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experiment. Then, we show that Tobia’s purported fallacies speak
to uses of corpus linguistics that we did not embrace in Judging
Ordinary Meaning. And finally, we clarify the use of corpus tools
that we propose and explain how we see those tools fitting into an
overall framework of legal interpretation.
1. Tobia’s results come from his flawed corpus condition
design.
Tobia’s critiques in his corpus condition analysis also flow
from methodological defects in his study design. Again, the data
don’t highlight flaws in corpus analysis generally, but rather in
Tobia’s flawed survey design.
Tobia gets prototype data from his corpus condition participants because he gives them only a list of collocates followed by
nine concordance lines. 238 That isn’t how a careful practitioner
uses corpus tools. A prudent, informed use of the tools can avoid
the problems that Tobia is concerned with.
Tobia claims to be giving his study participants “precisely”
what practitioners of corpus analysis would give them. 239 But that
is wrong. Tobia gives his corpus condition participants only a list
of common collocates of “vehicle” and nine bare concordance lines.
By asking them to assess the dummy term “ailac,” he then robs
participants of any access to their linguistic intuition about the
actual term in question (“vehicle”).
All of these moves run contrary to the methods we have advocated. And all of them predictably skew the numbers in Tobia’s
survey.
In our corpus analyses (in judicial opinions and academic articles), we have always started with linguistic intuition regarding
the range of meanings of a studied term. And we have used dictionaries to establish a starting set of possible senses of the studied term that we may then seek to measure in a chosen corpus.
We did that in our “vehicles” analysis in Judging Ordinary
Meaning. 240 That is an important first step. Without it, and especially when looking for meaning of a dummy term, the empirical
design effectively dictates “prototype” results. If study participants have no range of senses of the studied term in mind and are
Id. at 755–56, 756 n.137.
Id. at 756 (emphasis in original).
240 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 800–02 (coming
up with different possible senses of the word “vehicle” by resorting to dictionaries and
linguistic intuition).
238
239
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given only a list of collocates and examples, they are left with
nothing more to do than to establish a mental picture of attributes
of the examples they are given. That is prototype analysis. And
Tobia’s prototype results flow from this study design.
Tobia’s results are skewed further by the dumbed-down corpus evidence that he gives his study participants. We have never
used a list of collocates as a determinative basis for assessing ordinary meaning. We have always paired such a list with a starting set of definitions or senses of a studied term. 241 In assessing
the relative frequency of competing senses, moreover, we have
never examined a list of concordance lines that is anywhere near
the bare nine lines that Tobia employed. 242 In Judging Ordinary
Meaning, one of our key selling points was the ability of corpus
analysis to allow us to use relatively large numbers of concordance lines to improve the statistical reliability of our analysis. 243
And we acknowledged that a limited evidence set could produce
the same kind of bias we might find in a panel of judges. 244
One important reason to examine a large number of concordance lines is to overcome the risk that a small number of people
(like the nine people who sit on the U.S. Supreme Court) will understand a term differently than the speech community in which
we’re interested. By presenting only nine concordance lines and
depriving study participants of any background knowledge of lexical information about the studied term, Tobia is eliminating the
possibility of assembling any useful evidence. His results tell us
nothing useful about the effect of corpus evidence. They tell us
241

See, e.g., id.
See, e.g., id. at 841 (“In order to examine the sense distribution of vehicle, we reviewed one hundred randomized concordance lines of vehicle in the NOW Corpus.” (emphasis in original)).
243 See, e.g., id. at 795 (advocating the use of corpus linguistics because it employs
“large bodies—corpora—of naturally occurring language” that allow us to “look for patterns in meaning and usage in large databases of actual written language” and “allow us
to conceptualize and measure the ‘standard picture’ in a much more careful way” (emphasis in original)); id. at 820 (explaining that the “large bodies or databases of naturally
occurring language” means that “[c]orpus analysis has allowed lexicographers to address
the problem of sense division with greater granularity” and “view a more complete range
of potential uses of a given word and collect statistical information about the likelihood of
a given word appearing in a particular semantic environment”).
244 See, e.g., id. at 878 (“Moving forward, judges, lawyers, and linguists will need to
collaborate to settle on some best practices in this emerging field” such as establishing
“standards for the appropriate sample size for a given search.”); see also id. at 866 (“Corpus
data can be gathered and analyzed properly only with care and a little background and
training in the underlying methodology. A judge who proceeds willy-nilly may, either consciously or unwittingly, proffer data that has only the appearance of careful empiricism.”).
242
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only what people are likely to do with hopelessly scant and flawed
corpus evidence.
2. Tobia’s fallacies misstate our views.
The two “fallacies” invoked by Tobia are straw men. We have
not adopted and do not endorse the notion that any “use that is
not reflected” in a corpus 245 (or is even only uncommonly reflected)
cannot fall within the “ordinary meaning” of a studied term. As to
whether an airplane is a vehicle, we did “ask” in Judging Ordinary Meaning “if airplane is even a possible sense of vehicle” given
that we found no example of anyone speaking of an airplane as a
vehicle in the corpus. 246 But the quoted sentence was phrased as
a question to be considered. And in forming the question, we were
just highlighting a larger point about the kinds of questions that
corpus evidence can answer.
Because one sense of ordinary meaning is a possible or previously attested sense of a term, we were noting that an interpreter
who believes that an unattested example of a given use of a term
is not covered by the ordinary meaning of a statute might reject
“airplane” as falling outside the statute. 247
Elsewhere in our article, moreover, we went to great lengths
to stop short of committing to a correct sense of “ordinary meaning.” We emphasized that the choice of a concept of ordinary
meaning is a matter for our legal theory of interpretation. 248 And
we highlighted the range of policy considerations and social values that might favor each of a range of senses of “ordinary meaning.” 249 Tobia’s critiques miss these nuances. And by missing them

Tobia, supra note 17, at 795.
Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 844 (emphasis in
original).
247 See id. at 844–45 (emphasis in original):
245
246

To the extent that airplane fits what some lexicographers have regarded as the
necessary and sufficient conditions for inclusion in the class of vehicles (i.e., anything that is a “means of carriage, conveyance, or transport”), all that can be said
of airplane is that it may be a possible meaning of vehicle, but it is unattested in
the corpus data.
248 See, e.g., id. at 874 (“It is a question for law—‘we have to decide which meaning,
produced by which theory of meaning, we ought to pick.’” (emphasis in original) (quoting
Baude & Sachs, supra note 68, at 1089–90)).
249 See, e.g., id. (“We think the answers to these questions are dictated in part by the
rationales that drive us to consider ordinary meaning. A concern for fair notice and protection of reliance interests may well direct us to stop at the top-of-mind sense of a statutory term.”).
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he misattributes the cited fallacies to our proposed corpus linguistic analysis.
Tobia’s critique also misses another important nuance in our
analysis. In discussing a range of examples of lexical ambiguity
in Judging Ordinary Meaning, we acknowledged the complications that arise in circumstances in which each of two competing
senses of a term is “closely related” to the other. 250 And, citing an
insightful article by Professors Larry Solan and Tammy Gales, we
noted the question whether “corpus data may reflect only the fact
that a given sense of a certain term is a more factually common
iteration of that term in the real world.” 251 These are questions
implicated by Tobia’s critique. But Tobia does not engage with
them. He does not even acknowledge the discussion of these problems in Judging Ordinary Meaning.
Our discussion of the related senses problem analyzed both a
hypothetical and Taniguchi. The question in Taniguchi was
straightforward—whether a statute authorizing an award of
costs for the use of an “interpreter” encompassed the services of a
written translator or was limited only to face-to-face oral translation services. We noted that the corpus evidence shows that the
vast majority of uses of the term “interpreter” are in reference to
a face-to-face translator. But we noted that “[t]he notion of oral
translator could simply be perceived as a more common ‘prototype’ of the more general notion of ‘one who translates,’” while the
“written translator idea could [ ] be viewed as an atypical example.” 252 Far from committing to the Nonappearance or Uncommon
Use Fallacies, we emphasized that the nonappearance or limited
appearance of a closely related sense of a term “would not tell us
that an ordinary person would not understand text providing for
compensation for an interpreter to cover a written translator.” 253
We highlighted this point by reference to a hypothetical
rental agreement prohibiting tenants from keeping “dogs, cats,
250

Id. at 852 (citation omitted):

One possible limitation [of corpus linguistics] stems from the vagaries of word
sense division. Sense division is subjective. . . . [Linguists] concede that distinctions among senses may be “more of a descriptive device rather than a claim
about psycholinguistic reality.” This seems particularly true as regards closely
related or fine-grained sense distinctions.
251 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 873–74 (summarizing a concern raised by Solan and Gales, since published in Solan & Gales, supra note
13, at 1351).
252 Id. at 821 (emphasis in original).
253 Id. (emphasis in original).
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birds, or other pets.” 254 We noted that a tenant “found in possession of a caged dodo” would “not likely [ ] escape the wrath of the
landlord by insisting that a dodo is an ‘obsolete’ sort of a bird” not
attested in a corpus. 255
A further elaboration of this point appeared in our discussion
of the Solan-Gales question noted above. We conceded that “the
fact that a given sense of a certain term is a more factually common iteration of that term in the real world” could give “reason to
doubt the probity of the data in establishing the semantic meaning” of a statutory term. 256 We emphasized the importance of this
concern and warned that “anyone turning to corpus analysis
would do well to consider [this] limitation[ ] before jumping too
quickly to an inference about ordinary meaning.” 257 And we proceeded to highlight a key element of our thesis: that corpus tools
can help operationalize a wide range of senses of ordinary meaning seemingly embedded in the law of interpretation, but that
the choice among those senses is a matter for our legal theory of
interpretation. 258
On the question whether to credit a “top-of-mind” sense that
might match up closely with linguistic prototype or a “possibly
broader, ‘reflective’ sense,” 259 we discussed the question presented
in Muscarello—whether transporting a gun in the locked glove
box of a car counts as “carrying” it in relation to a drug crime.
After noting that the overwhelming majority of corpus uses of a
person carrying a firearm involve personally bearing or “packing”
a gun, we questioned “whether to credit only the top-of-mind
sense” in line with corpus evidence or include a broader sense that
might be viewed to be closely related and included in a “reflective”
sense of the term (e.g., transporting a gun in a car). 260 Instead of
committing to the former, we noted that this choice is “a question
for law—‘we have to decide which meaning, produced by which
theory of meaning, we ought to pick.’” 261
This looks nothing like the Nonappearance or Uncommon
Use Fallacy. It is a nuanced clarification of a problem with which
254

Id.
Id.
256 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 873–74.
257 Id. at 874.
258 See id. at 874–76.
259 Id. at 874.
260 Id.
261 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 874 (emphasis in
original) (quoting Baude & Sachs, supra note 68, at 1089–90).
255
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all theories of interpretation must grapple. The difficulty does
not reveal any “deficiency in corpus data—or even in linguistic
theory.” 262 It just highlights an unresolved problem for legal interpretive theory.
In our article, we made clear that the choice of a concept of
ordinary meaning is “dictated in part by the rationales that drive
us to consider ordinary meaning.” 263 “A concern for fair notice and
protection of reliance interests,” for example, “may well direct us
to stop at the top-of-mind sense of a statutory term.” 264
If the personally bear sense of carry is the first one that comes
to mind, then that may be the sense that the public will have
in mind upon reading the terms of a statute, and if we are
interested in protecting reliance interests and avoiding unfair surprise, we may want to stop short of including the
broader transport sense that the public might concede to be
covered upon reflection. 265
If, on the other hand, we are convinced that the two senses of
“carry” are indistinguishable, or that our sense of the pragmatic
context of a statute convinces us that the lawmaker could not
have intended a difference, then we may wish to sweep in the
broader, “reflective” sense of “carry.” But that, again, is a matter
for legal theory. If we did go with the “reflective” sense, we would
be crediting an alternative set of polices or values—a “faithful
agent” theory of interpretation. 266 This credits the presumed intentions of the lawmaker. That is the point of our dodo bird example. A dodo may be so long forgotten that it is unattested in
a modern corpus. But because there is no sense of “birdness”
that includes a common example like a parakeet but excludes
an uncommon example like a dodo, there is no basis for excluding the dodo.
3. Tobia’s critiques highlight the need to refine our
methodology.
The above should close the door on the notion that corpus
tools can reveal only prototypical meaning. It should also highlight the fact that there is no Nonappearance or Uncommon Use
262
263
264
265
266

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 874 (emphasis in original).
See Sunstein, supra note 93, at 435.
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Fallacy in our article. Tobia’s responses, however, highlight the
need for some clarification and increased refinement of our proposed methodology. Some of the refinement appears in Judging
Ordinary Meaning—in sections dealing specifically with at least
one of the examples (golf carts) that Tobia criticizes us for excluding. We restate and amplify our analysis of the golf cart example
here, with an eye toward refining the methodology that we propose (and that Tobia has either missed or chosen to ignore).
Tobia criticizes corpus analysis for purportedly excluding golf
carts, airplanes, and bicycles, which he deems to fall within the
ordinary meaning of vehicle. 267 Yet he presents no defensible basis
for his conception of ordinary meaning. 268 And his critique ignores
not only the nuances in our theory but our specific analysis of golf
carts. In Judging Ordinary Meaning, we noted that “[w]e found
no examples of golf carts as vehicles in the corpus” but immediately suggested that that did not “mean they do not qualify under
the ordinary meaning of vehicle.” 269 Instead, we explained that the
absence of golf cart examples in the corpus requires more careful
thinking about (a) the necessary and sufficient components of “vehicleness” as informed by the example senses in the corpus’s concordance lines and (b) whether the specific example in question
(golf cart) falls within that concept of “vehicle.” 270 Thus, we noted
that “a golf cart shares a number of features with the most common vehicles” (automobiles) but that it also differs in some respects. 271 And we stated that “[t]he question whether a golf cart
fits into the ordinary meaning of vehicle . . . is [ ] a difficult one”
that “turns on the viability of the sense divisions at work—on
whether the golf cart is an unusual example [of the ordinary sense
of vehicle] or perceived as a distinct linguistic construct.” 272

Tobia, supra note 17, at 757.
Tobia’s “concept condition” data do not establish such a basis for all the reasons
explained in Part IV.A. And the only other basis for Tobia’s conclusion is the invocation of
“common sense,” id. at 795—a move that ought to trouble him (and troubles us) in light of
the concerns he raises elsewhere about motivated reasoning, id. at 776, 778. There is an
irony in Tobia’s analysis of this point. For all his focus on “testing ordinary meaning,”
Tobia never commits to a tool for assessing the ordinary meaning of language. He simply
critiques the tools that others use and falls back on the idea that the flaws in those tools
suggest the need to rely more on things like context, history, legislative purpose, and
“other interpretive commitments.” Id. at 778.
269 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 859.
270 See id. at 859–60.
271 Id. at 859.
272 Id. at 859–60 (emphasis omitted).
267
268
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To answer this question in a reliable way, we noted that it
could be helpful to develop “further corpus analysis” that could
help us “assemble a list of criteria for things we speak of as an
automobile,” which would then allow us to “ask whether a golf
cart has those criteria.” 273 To illustrate our approach, we suggested that “[p]ossible criteria” for “vehicleness” could “include a
steering wheel, motor, wheels for passage on land, and seats for
passengers.” 274 We conceded that “a golf cart might count” as a
vehicle “[i]f those are the criteria.” 275 But we also suggested the
possibility of other criteria, “like usual usage on paved roads or
highways, or licensure by the state motor vehicle division.” 276 And
we noted that “if those are the criteria, then a golf cart might not
count.” 277
We also conceded that a complete analysis of the golf cart
question could extend to the use of other experimental tools. 278 We
noted that such tools are “costly to design and implement” and
are “notoriously susceptible to context effects and response
bias.” 279 But we opened the door to the possibility that “these alternative empirical linguistic methods [may] provide possible approaches to addressing questions of ordinary meaning beyond the
use of corpus linguistics.” 280 We are still of that view. We hold hope
of a future in which questions about ordinary meaning are informed not just by linguistic intuition, dictionaries, and corpus
tools, but also by reliable survey experiments. We see barriers
and limitations to the utility of each of these tools, but see no reason to exclude any of them a priori.
In wrapping up our discussion of the “vehicle” problem in
Judging Ordinary Meaning, we conceded the possibility that
“[t]he limitations of the empirical methods” we had identified
could lead to a dead end—to the conclusion “that we cannot give
a conclusive answer to the question of whether the ordinary
meaning of vehicle extends to the golf cart.” 281 In so doing, we emphasized the possibility that at that point the interpretive inquiry
could “fall back” to other interpretive inquiries that seek to
273
274
275
276
277
278
279
280
281

Id. at 860.
Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 860 n.257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 860–62.
See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 860–61.
Id. at 862.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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establish the “legal content” of law that may not necessarily be
“in line with its communicative content.” 282
We stand by that position. But we hasten to emphasize that
there are ample reasons to seek first to inquire into the law’s communicative content. And we think that refined corpus methods
will be an important element of this first-order inquiry. With that
in mind, we close with some points of refinement, as applied to
another of Tobia’s examples: the cement mixer. 283
Assume the cement mixer is in fact an example of an item
that does not appear in the corpus as a “vehicle.” That would not
mean that it does not fall within the ordinary meaning of vehicle.
It surely would count, as it would meet any of the necessary and
sufficient criteria for “vehicleness.” A cement mixer has each and
every one of the conditions of “vehicleness” hypothesized above. It
has a steering wheel, a motor, wheels for passage on land, and
seats for passengers; and it is a vehicle that is used on highways
and required to be registered by a state department of motor vehicles. For those reasons it seems apparent that the nonappearance of cement mixer in the corpus would just be a “dodo bird”—
or, to use a parallel example raised by Solan and Gales, a “blue
pitta” (a bird, which may appear rarely, if at all, in corpora of
American English or be thought of as an example of a “bird” because it is found in Asia and not North America, but has all the
necessary and sufficient conditions of “birdness”). 284 And because
it seems impossible to imagine any criteria of “vehicleness” that
would not sweep in the cement mixer, we can conclude that its
nonappearance is beside the point and does not undermine the
conclusion that it falls within the ordinary meaning of vehicle.
This suggests some needed refinements to our approach. One
refinement can build on interpretive principles presented by Professor Larry Solum in his work on constitutional interpretation.
Solum draws an important distinction between “original expected
application[s]” of a constitutional provision and the legal principle
embedded in the “[o]riginal public meaning” of the text. 285 He clarifies that what is fixed in the law is the principle embedded in its
communicative content. Expected applications, at most, have
282

Id.
Tobia, supra note 17, at 796.
284 Solan & Gales, supra note 13, at 1315.
285 Lawrence B. Solum, Triangulating Public Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, Immersion, and the Constitutional Record, 2017 BYU L. REV. 1621, 1637 (first alteration in original) (quotation marks omitted) (“The meaning of a text is one thing; expectations about
how the text will or should be applied to particular cases or issues is another.”).
283

2021]

The Corpus and the Critics

341

evidential significance—they can help inform ambiguities in our
interpretation of the communicative content, but they do not define or limit the reach of the language of law. 286
These principles can refine our analysis of the golf cart and
cement mixer questions. Through corpus analysis and otherwise,
we can define the reach of the legal concept embedded in the communicative content of “vehicle”—in identifying the necessary and
sufficient conditions of “vehicleness.” The corpus evidence will
also help identify some expected applications of a law covering
vehicles. If a golf cart or cement mixer doesn’t appear in the corpus,
that may tell us that the legislative body may not have been thinking of these examples in enacting the law in question (or, perhaps,
that people subject to the law would not think of these examples at
first blush). But that doesn’t tell us that these examples are excluded. Expected applications have only evidential significance.
They can help us define the necessary and sufficient conditions of
“vehicleness,” but they do not necessarily define the full reach of
the legal concept embedded in the language of the law.
Tobia seems to miss this nuance in his criticism of corpus
analysis. In suggesting that corpus tools would exclude the golf
cart or the cement mixer, he assumes that ordinary meaning is
limited to its expected applications. That has never been our
claim, nor the point of corpus analysis. But we hope this refinement will help avoid further misunderstandings of this nature.
V. ORDINARY MEANING AND FREQUENCY OF OCCURRENCE
Perhaps the most persistent criticism of the use of corpus
tools in legal interpretation has been referred to as the “frequency
fallacy.” 287 This critique posits that corpus advocates merely use
linguistic corpora to determine the most commonly used sense of
a word, and then label that the ordinary meaning. 288
286

See id. at 1637–38 (emphasis in original):

Thus, the framers and ratifiers of the Second Amendment may have expected
that the “right to . . . bear Arms” would be applied to muskets and flintlocks, but
the meaning of arms is more general and would encompass modern weapons. . . .
Although original expected applications do not constitute the original meaning
of the constitutional text, they are nonetheless relevant to constitutional interpretation because they can provide evidence of the original public meaning.

287 See generally, e.g., Shlomo Klapper, (Mis)Judging Ordinary Meaning: Corpus Linguistics, the Frequency Fallacy, and the Extension-Abstraction Distinction in “Ordinary
Meaning” Textualism, 8 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 327 (2019).
288 See Tobia, supra note 17, at 796 (defining the “Comparative Use Fallacy” as “when
considering two possible senses, the comparatively greater support for one sense in the
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The frequency fallacy is another straw man. It has no foundation in our writing on law and corpus linguistics. Indeed, both
of us have expressly disavowed an approach that merely seeks to
determine the most common sense of a word and then labels that
sense the ordinary meaning. 289 As we have said, such an approach
would be arbitrary. 290
Proponents of the frequency fallacy assert that corpus linguistics represents a “new theory about how statutes ought to be
interpreted”—one that reframes the question of ordinary meaning as an empirical question that “ought to be answered by how
frequently a term is used in a particular way.” 291 But we have
never advocated the blind acceptance of the most common sense
of a word, and the notion that courts consider frequency is not a
reframing of the question of ordinary meaning. It is just one of
the ways (certainly not the only way) that courts have talked
about ordinary meaning. As we point out in Judging Ordinary
Meaning, courts often frame the question of ordinary meaning in

corpus indicates that this sense is a better candidate for ordinary meaning”); Ethan J.
Herenstein, The Faulty Frequency Hypothesis: Difficulties in Operationalizing Ordinary
Meaning Through Corpus Linguistics, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 113 (2017) (ascribing
to us the view that “where an ambiguous term retains two plausible meanings, the ordinary meaning of the term (and the one that ought to control) is the more frequently used
meaning of the term”); James A. Macleod, Ordinary Causation: A Study in Experimental
Statutory Interpretation, 94 IND. L.J. 957, 988 (2019) (“Legal scholars drawing on corpus
linguists search corpora for a given word or phrase to ascertain the frequency with which
it is used in a given manner.”).
289 See J.M.W. v. T.I.Z. (In re Adoption of Baby E.Z.), 266 P.3d 702, 726 (Utah 2011)
(Lee, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (citation omitted):
I share the view that we should not blindly attribute to every statutory term its
most frequent meaning. . . . Such an approach would be arbitrary and would lead
to statutory incoherence. This is not the approach I have articulated, and not
the one I have followed in my consideration of corpus linguistic data.
See also Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 1, at 1962:
My contention is not that because [carry on your person] is far more common
than [carry in a car], § 924(c) ought to be interpreted with the [carry on your
person] meaning. Such a reading would be arbitrary. There are undoubtedly circumstances in which Congress employs the less frequent of two senses of a word.
290 See In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d at 726 (Lee, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment); Mouritsen, Definitional Fallacies, supra note 1, at 1962. Here
we feel some solidarity with Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott. See Alan
Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Interpretation Redux, 119 YALE L.J. 926, 932–33
(2010) (“Initially, though our article was the first cut at a difficult subject, and so was less
clear than it could have been, the mistakes in representing our view are hard to explain
as resulting only from a lack of clarity on our part.”).
291 Hessick, supra note 16, at 1506.
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terms of frequency, sometimes referring to possible, common,
most common, or exclusive ways in which words are used. 292
Judicial consideration of frequency is not surprising and not
problematic in itself. The concept of ordinariness evokes a notion
of things that more commonly occur or things that are more commonly experienced. 293 Still, we agree that the “more common” formulation is not the only way that judges talk about ordinary
meaning. Sometimes courts speak of “ordinary meaning” to refer
to whether a meaning is “permitted,” “obvious,” or something a
“reasonable person” would say or understand. 294 Courts also “focus
on whether or not it feels ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ to apply a given

292 See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 800; see also,
e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 149 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (using a “possible” sense of ordinary when arguing that a word sense is ordinary because it is “hardly implausible nor
at odds with an accepted meaning” of the statutory terms); Taniguchi, 566 U.S. at 569
(rejecting a sense as ordinary when it was merely a “possible” meaning but “hardly a common or ordinary meaning”); Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128–29, 131 (employing a “common”
sense of ordinary when asserting that the transport-in-a-vehicle sense of “carry” is ordinary because “many”—“perhaps more than one-third”—of the instances of “carrying a firearm” in the New York Times and U.S. News databases reflect that sense, and because the
ordinary sense of “‘carry’ includes conveyance in a vehicle”) (emphasis added)); id. at 128
(referring to a “most common” sense of ordinary when reasoning that “we believe Congress
intended to use the word in its primary sense and not in this latter, special way”); id. at
143 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (speaking in terms of the “most common” sense of ordinary
by referring to “what meaning showed up some two-thirds of the time” as opposed to the
alternative sense which showed up “‘more than one-third’ of the time”).
293 See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1589 (3d ed. 2002) (defining “ordinary” as “being of frequent occurrence”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1241 (5th ed. 2011) (defining “ordinary” as “[c]ommonly encountered; usual”); THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1363
(2nd ed. 1987) (defining “ordinary” as “the commonplace or average condition, degree,
etc.”). Professor Hessick insists that use of dictionaries by corpus advocates is somehow
“almost ironic,” Hessick, supra note 16, at 1508 n.16, but as we have repeatedly made
clear, we have no objections to the use of dictionaries for defining terms or highlighting a
range of possible uses. See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at
826 (explaining that dictionaries “can be useful for defining unknown terms and attesting
contested uses”); In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 266 P.3d at 729 (Lee, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (“I have no problem citing dictionaries for the information
that they do contain. Dictionaries may help the court by defining unknown terms or presenting a range of possible meanings that a term may bear in a given context.” (emphasis
in original)); State v. Rasabout, 356 P.3d 1258, 1272 (Utah 2015) (Lee, A.C.J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that dictionaries are “useful in cataloging
a range of possible meanings that a statutory term may bear” (quoting Hi-County Prop.
Rts. Grp. v. Emmer, 304 P.3d 851, 856 (Utah 2013))). Our objection is the reliance on
dictionaries to determine ordinary meaning.
294 Hessick, supra note 16, at 1507. Though we note that we disagree with Hessick’s
assertion that “[n]one of these usages is empirical—or at least they are not readily quantifiable.” Id. We believe that there are a number of ways that linguists might test whether
a meaning is obvious or how it would be understood by a reasonable person.
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term or phrase to a particular example.” 295 And we agree that
judges sometimes appear to be invoking a concept of ordinary
meaning that is similar to the linguistic notion of a prototype. 296
We disagree, however, with any suggestion that judges (or
even any given judge) use any of these notions of ordinariness exclusively. None of these conceptions of ordinary meaning should
be taken as the definitive notion of ordinary meaning. The point
of our discussion of different conceptions of ordinary meaning is
to highlight the fact that, “ironically, we have no ordinary meaning of ‘ordinary meaning.’” 297 Judges and lawyers lack a shared,
coherent, and workable understanding of this concept. Sometimes
individual judges contradict themselves within a single opinion. 298
And often it is not obvious that two closely related uses of a word
are in fact different senses, as judges often assume.
While we do not endorse the view that blindly attributes to
each word its most frequent sense, we think the frequency assessment should play a role in the interpretation of legal texts. We
have said that
a complete theory of ordinary meaning requires us to take
into account not only the comparative frequency of different
senses, but also the context of an utterance [including the
syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic context in which an utterance occurs], its historical usage and the speech community in which it was uttered. 299
And if all of these factors are to be taken into account, we will
need a method to gather evidence of such usage.
This view of the role of context permeates Judging Ordinary
Meaning, and its application is illustrated in several of the examples in the paper. In assessing the “carries a firearm” question in
Muscarello, for example, we spoke at length of the need to assess
not just the frequency of different senses of the verb “carry,” but
also to consider the use of the verb “carry” in the context of
Macleod, supra note 288, at 990.
See Lawrence M. Solan, Why Laws Work Pretty Well, but Not Great: Words and
Rules in Legal Interpretation, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 243, 258 (2001) (“Some Supreme
Court cases concerning statutory interpretation can be seen as battles among the justices
over definitions versus prototypes.”).
297 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 798.
298 See, e.g., Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 128–31 (toggling between the “common” and
“most common” senses of ordinary in the majority opinion); id. at 143–44, 149 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (toggling between the “possible” and “most common” sense of ordinary in
the dissent); supra text accompanying note 292.
299 Lee & Mouritsen, Corpus Linguistics, supra note 4 (emphasis added).
295
296
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“firearm” and its synonyms by looking at concordance lines in
which the carrying is being done by a human subject, and to make
this examination at a given time and with respect an appropriate
language community. 300 Corpus tools allow us to do all of that.
They provide evidence of the syntactic argument structure in
which the word occurs, the semantic features of a given utterance,
the linguistic conventions prevailing at the time that the words of
a legal text were first executed, and the linguistic conventions
prevailing in the relevant speech community, genre, and register
in which the words are used. This is important because words can
take on different meanings when used with different inflections,
in different parts of speech, or when they merely co-occur with
different collocates. And existing tools (dictionaries, intuition,
etc.) do not allow for any of this kind of assessment. So unless we
are going to abandon the search for ordinary meaning altogether,
we need the new tools.
Responding to this more nuanced framework, Professor
Hessick has argued that “everyone agrees that context is important.” 301 But mutual agreement about the importance of context
is irrelevant where courts lack a shared understanding of what
context means or a viable means of examining language usage in
those contexts.
Our contention is not that corpus linguistics will provide
push-button answers to difficult questions of legal interpretation
simply by highlighting the most common sense of a word. Instead,
language evidence from linguistic corpora can help us give content to an otherwise vague and empty term like ordinary meaning, by providing evidence of the way words and phrases are used
in particularized contexts, in particular speech communities or
linguistic registers, and at particular times. Once jurists have a
more accurate picture of prevailing linguistic conventions, they
will have to make difficult jurisprudential decisions about what
language evidence is useful and how such evidence can inform
(and perhaps modify) interpretive practices.
Corpus tools do not supplant a judge’s experience, training, or
professional judgment. They are a check against the judge’s linguistic intuition. Hessick offered a puzzling retort. She said that
“[t]he idea that the traditional ordinary meaning inquiry is somehow inferior to a frequency analysis because judges might rely on

300
301

See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 845–48.
Hessick, supra note 16, at 1514 n.43.
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their intuition—that is, their professional judgment—rejects the
very foundation of the judicial role.” 302 There is a lot to unpack in
this sentence. To begin with, Hessick used the phrase “traditional
ordinary meaning inquiry” as if judges and lawyers have some sort
of shared, coherent understanding of what “ordinary meaning” actually means. They don’t. 303 Hessick and others have implicitly
acknowledged this very problem by highlighting ways in which
courts describe their search for ordinary meaning. 304
More importantly, Hessick’s statement conflated (and incorrectly suggested that we conflate) a judge’s “intuition” with a
judge’s “professional judgment.” There is no foundation in any of
our writing for this move. We are in no way against the judge’s
reliance on her professional judgment—informed by her training,
education, or experience—in judging ordinary meaning. Our concerns about “intuition” are directed to the judge’s “linguistic intuition,” not her “professional judgment.” 305 Judges, like all human
Id. at 1511.
See Clark D. Cunningham, Judith N. Levi, Georgia M. Green & Jeffrey P. Kaplan,
Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561, 1563–65 (1994) (explaining that “the
phrase ‘plain meaning’ itself presents interpretive difficulties” and discussing various,
conflicting senses of the phrase); see also Sandra F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory
Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas Is Not Justified by Any Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 764–65 (2006) (“While the term ‘plain meaning’ exudes a sense
of simplicity, such an assumption would be misplaced because the exact contours of plain
meaning interpretation are debated.”); Richard J. Lazarus & Claudia M. Newman, City of
Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund: Searching for Plain Meaning in Unambiguous
Ambiguity, 4 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 15 (1995) (“[T]he definition of ‘plain meaning’ is itself
anything but plain. How much ambiguity is required before the meaning of a provision
becomes ambiguous? Words are hardly ever entirely free of ambiguity and there is almost
always room for disagreement based on at least plausible readings.”).
304 See Hessick, supra note 16, at 1507 (“Sometimes courts use the term ‘ordinary
meaning’ to refer to whether a meaning is permitted, sometimes to refer to whether the
meaning is obvious, and sometimes to refer to the meaning that the hypothetical reasonable person would give to the statutory language.” (citations omitted)). A “permissible”
meaning and an “obvious” meaning are not necessarily the same thing. A meaning can be
permissible without being obvious. See also Macleod, supra note 288, at 990 (“[C]ourts’
ordinary meaning analysis tends to focus on whether or not it feels ‘natural’ or ‘appropriate’ to apply a given term or phrase to a particular example.”).
305 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 806 (“Typically,
this assessment is made at a gut level, on the basis of a judge’s linguistic intuition, without
recognition of the empirical nature of the question.” (emphasis added)); id. at 831 (“Linguistic corpora can perform a variety of tasks that cannot be performed by human linguistic intuition alone.” (emphasis added)); id. at 857 (“Our linguistic intuitions about usage
and meaning in our own time and our own speech community can be highly unreliable.
But this problem is amplified when we are interpreting a text that dates from a period of
which we have no linguistic memory or experience.” (emphasis in original)); Stephen C.
Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical
Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 175 (2011) (citation omitted):
302
303
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beings, have a language faculty that has certain limitations. One
of those limitations is that a great deal of information regarding
language use is “not susceptible to recovery via introspection.” 306
This is in part because, “[i]n many cases, humans tend to notice
unusual occurrences more than typical occurrences.” 307 Judges
and lawyers, like all language users, may not be particularly
adept at objectively and predictably identifying and resolving lexical ambiguities when faced with high-frequency, highly polysemous words—words that occur often and that have a lot of different, related senses. 308 This is a problem because word frequency
is correlated with polysemy—the more commonly a word is used,
the more likely it is to have many different senses, and the more
senses it has, the more likely two people are to disagree as to its
meaning in a given context. 309 Judges and lawyers have no special
immunity from this and other linguistic limitations. And our argument is simply that linguistic corpora may provide language
evidence through which judges and lawyers can test their intuitions about the meaning of a legal text.
Another criticism is that linguistic corpora may not reflect
ordinary usage, but instead will “reflect the prevalence or newsworthiness of the underlying phenomenon that the term

With regard to linguistic intuition, a judge is “as liable to be as deviant as the
next man.” . . . [J]udges are subject to the same linguistic limitations as the rest
of us, which limitations include the inability to intuit which features of the language are common or ordinary and which are unusual.
See also id. at 178 (“This is not to say that a judge’s linguistic intuition is useless. Human
experience with language allows the judge—like any other language user—to recognize
almost instantly which uses of a given term are grammatically correct and which are
not.”); id. at 204 (“Against this backdrop, the corpus methodology presents an attractive
alternative [ ] to the judge’s sometimes unreliable linguistic intuition.”).
306 TONY MCENERY & ANDREW WILSON, CORPUS LINGUISTICS 15 (2d ed. 2001).
307 BIBER, CONRAD & REPPEN, supra note 50, at 3.
308 See Scott Crossley, Tom Salsbury & Danielle McNamara, The Development of Polysemy and Frequency Use in English Second Language Speakers, 60 LANG. LEARNING 573,
575 (2010).
309 See id. at 576; see also Martha Palmer, Hwee Tou Ng & Hoa Trang Dang, Evaluation of WSD Systems, in WORD SENSE DISAMBIGUATION: ALGORITHMS AND APPLICATIONS
75, 91 (Eneko Agirre & Philip Edmonds eds., 2007) (noting that “[h]igh polysemy has a
detrimental effect” on the performance of disambiguation tasks); George Tsatsaronis,
Iraklis Varlamis & Kjetil Nørvåg, An Experimental Study on Unsupervised Graph-Based
Word Sense Disambiguation, in COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS AND INTELLIGENT TEXT
PROCESSING 184, 193 (Alexander Gelbukh ed., 2010) (noting that human annotators have
higher rates of disagreement when tasked with disambiguating highly polysemous words);
CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SEMANTICS 224 (Keith Brown & Keith Allan eds., 2009) (noting
that accuracy on word sense disambiguation tasks declines where finer-grained sense distinctions are required).
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denotes.” 310 Hessick offers the following thought experiment to illustrate this criticism:
Imagine . . . a dispute over the scope of a statute that provides relief for flood victims. The dispute centers around how
much water must have accumulated in an area in order for an
event to be considered a flood. A database search of how often
the word “flood” is used to refer to very large amounts of
accumulated water will doubtlessly be skewed by the fact
that instances of extensive flooding—such as New Orleans
after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 or Houston during Hurricane Harvey in 2017—will receive far more media coverage
than other events. Indeed, a corpus analysis may demonstrate
that seventy percent of all mentions of the word “flood” occur
in the context of these superstorms. But that does not tell us
whether the average American would understand the statutory term “flood” to include three inches of water in a homeowner’s basement after a neighboring water main burst. 311
This illustration does more to highlight the utility of corpus tools
than it does to undermine that utility.
Implicit in the illustration is the notion that the average
American’s understanding of the word “flood” would differ meaningfully from the word’s most salient, newsworthy usage at a
given time. This conclusion is possible, but not obvious. After all,
average Americans (and average American judges) are people,
and people view the world through the lens of a variety of systematic biases. One of these biases is the availability heuristic, which
is that people believe that events are more probable if examples
are easier to remember. 312
It is not difficult to imagine the ways in which the availability
bias might color the way that average Americans and judges alike
think about statutory terms. When a salient newsworthy event
like Hurricane Katrina or Hurricane Harvey occurs, our average
American speaker will be bombarded with nightly news
310 Herenstein, supra note 288, at 122; see also Macleod, supra note 288, at 988 (“Legal
scholars drawing on corpus linguists search corpora for a given word or phrase to ascertain
the frequency with which it is used in a given manner.”).
311 Hessick, supra note 16, at 1509.
312 NICK WILKINSON & MATTHIAS KLAES, AN INTRODUCTION TO BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS 120 (3d ed. 2017) (“The main source of error with the availability heuristic is
salience; this factor features in other types of bias also, but the main effect here is that
events that have been well publicized or are prominent in people’s memories tend to be
estimated as having exaggerated probabilities.” (emphasis omitted)).
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broadcasts, radio programs, podcasts, and watercooler talk about
the event. In the wake of a recent event of this nature, it is not
hard to imagine that individuals’ judgments about the meaning
of a statutory term could be shaped by an event that finds its way
into contemporary speech through a variety of vectors. These
same individuals may not be consciously aware of the ways that
recent salient events have shaped their perceptions of the meaning of “flood,” and they will no longer have introspective access to
their prior perceptions of meaning.
It is in this context that the examination of language evidence
in a corpus can aid the intuition of the interpreter. The interpreter can examine the use of the word “flood” through time to
determine whether the use of the word has changed over time
(and, in particular, whether the use of the word has changed since
the time of the passage of the imaginary statute in question).
Analyzing how hydrological events are reflected in historical language usage is precisely one of the things that corpus evidence
has been shown to be good at. 313
Using comparative corpus-based methods, an interpreter can
examine the use of a word across language genres, registers, and
speech communities to determine whether the word has taken on
some specialized meaning in a relevant speech community, register, or genre. Indeed, using comparative corpora, the interpreter
can check against the very problem the illustration is meant to
highlight—determining whether a given sense of a word is
overrepresented in newsprint, but less likely to be used in other
contexts. In addition, though no sample text is provided for the
hypothetical statute, examining the use of the text in contexts
similar to the statutory context may reveal usage patterns that
are not obviously available via introspection. Thus, the corpus can
help address precisely one of the problems the illustration is
meant to identify—providing a check against the outsized influence that real-world salience may have on judgments about ordinary meaning.
It is difficult to imagine how the “flood” illustration maps onto
any real-world interpretive scenario. The illustration posits the
ineffectiveness of corpus evidence without providing more than a
single word from the imagined statute. Again, this highlights a
313 See generally Tony McEnery, Helen Baker & Carmen Dayrell, Working at the
Interface of Hydrology and Corpus Linguistics: Using Corpora to Identify Droughts in
Nineteenth-Century Britain, in USING CORPUS METHODS TO TRIANGULATE LINGUISTIC
ANALYSIS 52 (Jesse Egbert & Paul Baker eds., 2019).
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main advantage of corpus analysis—that it allows us to examine
uses of words and phrases in particular syntactic, semantic, and
pragmatic contexts (and at particular times and in particular
speech communities).
Finally, as we discussed in Judging Ordinary Meaning, there
is a difference between addressing ambiguity on the one hand and
vagueness on the other in legal interpretation. With ambiguity,
two or more senses of a given word may be possible in a given
context. Vagueness, by contrast, is a question of scope. We can
make the case that “carry on your person” and “carry in a car” are
two different senses of “carry.” But a “big flood” and a “little flood”
are both floods. Not surprisingly, the use of the word “flood” to
describe basement flooding or flooding from a burst pipe is very
well attested, even in a corpus of newspapers and magazines. 314
Without more statutory context, it is impossible to predict how
this information could be used in determining how the statute
ought to be interpreted. But as discussed above, we have never
advocated for the blind application of the most frequent use of a
word as the ordinary meaning.
CONCLUSION
Professor Tobia asserts that his critiques “shift the argumentative burden” to those who advocate the use of corpus tools in
statutory interpretation. 315 He also challenges us to show that our
methods can produce “a nonarbitrary and reliable method of interpretation.” 316 This theme runs through each of the other criticisms leveled to date. And it falters on two fundamental grounds.
The first problem is that the starting premise is largely based
on a misstatement of our proposed methods. For the most part
the prevailing critiques serve only to further underscore basic
problems with existing methods of assessing the communicative
content of the language of law and to actively highlight core contributions (not shortcomings) of corpus methods. Corpus tools are
better able to address concerns about judging the right language
community. They also address concerns about fair notice. And they
have not been shown to be inaccurate or to falter on a supposed
nonappearance or frequency fallacy. On closer review, these
314 For example, “flood” appears within 5 words of “basement” in 234 codable concordance lines in the NOW Corpus, which compiles web-based newspapers and magazines.
NOW CORPUS (NEWS ON THE WEB), https://www.english-corpora.org/now/.
315 Tobia, supra note 17, at 805.
316 Id.
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criticisms help highlight salient features of corpus analysis. The
burden has not been shifted.
A second problem is in our critics’ failure to identify a framework or even any methods for a better alternative. No one can
credibly contend for an interpretive regime in which we ignore the
threshold inquiry into the ordinary communicative content of legal text. The search for such content is too embedded in our very
concept of written law—and too central to too many of the policy
premises that underlie it—to think that we could or should ever
avoid it. So no one seriously proposes that move. And in the absence of such a proposal the onus is on our critics to clarify how
they propose to paint the “standard picture”—whether they prefer to retain our current set of underdeterminate tools or, if not,
can proffer something that better accounts for the shortcomings
of the existing regime. None of them have done that.
We think the criticisms fail for all sorts of reasons explained
in detail above. But even if some of the pushback stands as highlighting imperfections in what we have proposed (and there certainly are some wrinkles to iron out), the onus is on those who
think that our methods are still not ideal to show how they could
perform this function better. It takes a method to beat a method.
And one of our core points has been to show that our methods
account for shortcomings in existing methods and do a better job
of assessing ordinary communicative content in a more transparent, reliable way.
None of our critics offer a framework for assessing the communicative content of difficult cases of lexical ambiguity—cases
like Muscarello, Taniguchi, and Mont. And without a replacement
method for resolving these kinds of cases, the utility of such criticism is limited.
Tobia comes closest to offering a substitute framework—or at
least appears at first glance to do so. But even he isn’t ultimately
suggesting that his survey methods should take the place of corpus methods (or existing tools). He is just claiming that his surveys show that corpus tools are imperfect. And from there his only
move is to suggest that we ought to fall back instead on tools that
can help us discern statutory purpose. 317 That move just takes us
back to square one, however, since all agree that the best

317 See id. at 804 (“Legal interpreters will have to look beyond the simple dictionary
definition and corpus frequency analysis—to the legal text’s context, history, and purpose;
and to their other interpretive commitments.”).
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indicator of purpose is in the statutory text 318 and any other indicator (like legislative history) will still require a framework and
toolkit for interpreting language (since legislative history is also
comprised of text).
All that said, the pushback advanced by our critics is still
constructive. It helps highlight the ongoing need for us to develop
and refine the proper use of corpus tools in statutory interpretation. To highlight some possible steps in that direction we will close
with some thoughts on refinements in corpus linguistic analysis of
the types of problems raised in cases like Muscarello, Taniguchi,
and Mont.
One difficulty presented by cases like those discussed above
is the “closely related senses” problem—the fact that the competing notions of “carry” (transport in a car versus personally bear),
“interpreter” (real-time oral translator versus written-text translator), and “imprisonment in connection with a conviction” (after
conviction versus before but later counted toward full term) can
either be viewed as two distinct senses or just a general sense that
encompasses more specific variations on a theme. An alternative
framing of this problem is the idea that “corpus data may reflect
only the fact that a given sense of a certain term is a more factually common iteration of that term in the real world.” 319 This is a
serious problem. And uncareful use of corpus evidence in cases
like these can gloss over the problem in a manner that may undermine its key selling points. We should instead be careful. And
we close with some ideas on how best to do so.
Before doing so, it is important to start by noting that this
problem is not just a problem for those who turn to corpus tools.
It is a problem for any theory or approach to interpretation. Corpus tools don’t create this problem. They just help refine our perception of ordinary meaning in a way that helps us see a complexity or nuance that we had previously missed. And the Court did
miss the complexity in each of the cited cases. The justices’ competing views on “carry,” “interpreter,” and “imprisonment” skate
318 See Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1756–58
(2010) (concluding, based on a comprehensive study of state court approaches to statutory
interpretation, that state courts are engaged in an “effort[ ] to increase predictability in
statutory interpretation,” and that they give primacy to text and decline to look to external
sources of meaning if they find the text “plain”).
319 Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 873–74 (summarizing a concern by Solan and Gales, since published in Solan & Gales, supra note 13, at
1351); see also Klapper, supra note 287, at 349.
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past the question whether they are really talking about separate
senses of these terms. In insisting on competing views of “imprisonment” in Mont, for example, the majority and dissent don’t just
have two different senses of ordinary meaning in mind (“permissible” versus “natural” sense of the term). 320 They each assume
that these are separate, competing senses. To the extent that is
debatable, the debate is one that all interpreters must confront.
We think corpus tools can best facilitate a meaningful analysis of that question. They can do so in two ways. First, corpus
analysis can provide a transparent view of the range of options
available to the interpreter—options that implicate a choice for
the chosen theory of interpretation. By analyzing a random set of
concordance lines from selected corpora, the interpreter can gain
access to important information that an interpreter would otherwise have to guess at. We highlight this contribution by outlining
proposed steps for corpus analysis of the interpretive question in
Mont—as to the ordinary communicative content of “imprisonment in connection with a conviction.”
Step one is to choose an appropriate corpus—a corpus that
can help us test the relevant language community. This is a
threshold question for our legal theory of interpretation. And it is
implicit in the conflict between the majority and dissent in Mont.
One difference between the two opinions is in the language community they have in mind. The majority seems to be seeking to
assess public meaning, citing dictionary definitions of “imprison”
in support of its conclusion that this verb “encompass[es] pretrial
detention.” 321 And the dissent’s disagreement stems, at least in
part, on its focus on Congress’s meaning. It cites provisions of the
U.S. Code in support of its view that “Congress regularly uses the
word ‘imprisoned’ (or ‘imprisonment’) to refer to a prison term following a conviction.” 322
Corpus analysis can help refine this debate. Instead of just
resorting to selected dictionary definitions we can assemble a
randomized set of concordance lines that can help us assemble
transparent evidence on how the term “imprison” is used by the
general public. And we can also systematize the inquiry that the
320 Compare Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832 (“[T]he definition of ‘is imprisoned’ may well
include pretrial detention.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 1838 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(“‘[I]mprisoned’ [ ] is most naturally understood in context to mean postconviction incarceration.”).
321 Id. at 1832.
322 Id. at 1838 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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dissent has in mind. By searching a corpus of statutory language
we can access systematic evidence to inform our inquiry into how
Congress uses “imprison” and “imprisonment.” The choice between these two types of corpora is a question for our theory of
interpretation. We take no position on the matter here, except to
emphasize that corpus tools can help refine this inquiry and make
it more transparent.
A second step is to consider and code the randomized concordance lines we assemble from our chosen corpora. In so doing we
can further inform the debate that is otherwise taking place at
the “take my word for it” level. Instead of just insisting that “imprison” “encompass[es] pretrial detention,” 323 on one hand, or that
the phrase “is imprisoned” “is most naturally understood in context to mean postconviction incarceration,” 324 we can assemble
transparent evidence from natural language usage to gauge the
reliability of these assertions.
Our analysis of “is imprisoned” shows that this term is most
often associated with a term of incarceration imposed after entry
of a conviction. Often this use of the statutory phrase isn’t apparent from the context of the concordance line. But where there is
enough context to tell, the reference is almost always in connection with incarceration after conviction.
The last step is to determine the significance of the corpus
evidence. Here we return to the “closely related senses” problem.
This is a key, unresolved problem in law and corpus linguistics.
And it is implicated in Mont, as it is possible to view the competing senses of “imprison” as either two separate senses or just two
alternative examples of a single sense.
In Judging Ordinary Meaning, we offered a starting point for
a response to this problem. We suggested that even where two
senses of a statutory term are closely related, the fact that one of
them is overrepresented in a corpus may tell us something important—that that sense is “likely to be the one that first comes
to mind when we think of this term.” 325 We conceded that this
“top-of-mind sense . . . may not exhaust the breadth of human
perception of th[e] term,” since on reflection, “some people might
concede that the term encompasses” other, less common examples. 326 And we noted that the choice between the two senses (“top323
324
325
326

Id. at 1832 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1838 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 874.
Id.
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of-mind” versus broader, “reflective” sense) “is not a deficiency in
corpus data” but a problem for our legal theory of interpretation. 327 The choice will be “dictated in part by the rationales that
drive us to consider ordinary meaning”—“[a] concern for fair notice and protection of reliance interests may [ ] direct us to stop at
the top-of-mind sense of a statutory term,” while other rationales
could press us to endorse a broader, reflective sense. 328
These principles are a good starting point for a corpusbased analysis of the Mont case. Corpus evidence suggests that
the top-of-mind sense of “imprisonment” is in connection with
post-conviction incarceration. Because that is the most frequently attested sense of this term, there are notice-based and
reliance-based reasons to limit the term to that application. But
there is nothing in corpus analysis that requires that outcome.
The term “imprisonment” can certainly be used to refer to any
form of detention. And it is fairly easy to find a rationale for extending the statutory term more broadly—a rationale, for example,
based on presumed congressional intent. 329
We stand by these points but also wish to offer some further
refinements. Although we still maintain that the threshold question for the closely related senses problem is a matter for legal theory, we think linguistic methods can further enhance the debate.
We highlight two possibilities here. One is a means of analysis proposed by Professors Solan and Gales, which they refer to as “double dissociation.” 330 The starting point is the notion that “the
strongest cases for using corpus analysis are ones in which not
only does one meaning predominate over an alternative meaning
in an appropriate corpus, but the second, less common meaning
is generally expressed using language other than the language in
the disputed statute.” Solan and Gales propose to test the inference from corpus analysis by using corpus tools to assess the language we use when expressing the alternative sense of a statutory
term. 331 If the alternative sense “is generally expressed using language other than the language in the disputed statute,” they say
327

Id.
Id.
329 See Mont, 139 S. Ct. at 1832 (noting that “Congress, like most States, instructs
courts calculating a term of imprisonment to credit pretrial detention as time served on a
subsequent conviction,” and concluding that it thus “makes sense that the phrase ‘imprison[ment] in connection with a conviction’ would include pretrial detention later credited as time served” (alteration in original)).
330 Solan & Gales, supra note 13, at 1315.
331 See id. at 1353.
328
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this helps dissociate the alternative sense from the language of
the statute. 332
We think this is an important next step in corpus analysis.
And we can use it to help reinforce a possible inference from the
corpus evidence of “imprisonment.” Corpus analysis shows that
when we speak of pretrial detention, we rarely use the terms “imprison” or “imprisonment.” Most often we use other terms like detain, detention, jail, or jailed.
We have performed some corpus analysis to support this conclusion. First we compiled a list of synonyms of “imprison,” based
on lists from various thesauruses. Our list was “incarcerate,”
“confine,” “detain,” and “jail.” Next we reviewed two hundred concordance lines for “imprison” and each of the synonyms. We used
this analysis to determine how often each term refers to pretrial
detention. We multiplied the frequency with which each term refers to pretrial detention by the term’s frequency in the corpus:
the resulting frequency for “imprison,” for example, would show
how commonly the corpus includes the term “imprison” when it
communicates the meaning of “pretrial detention” (e.g., if 10% of
words in the corpus were “imprison,” and imprison refers to pretrial detention 50% of the time, then 5% of the words in the corpus
are “imprison” referring to pretrial detention). By adding the resulting product for all the synonyms, we predicted roughly how
often any term in the corpus refers to “pretrial detention” (the
prediction is a little less than the real figure, because some nonsynonym terms might refer to pretrial detention a few times). We
then divided the percent of the time that the term “imprison” refers to pretrial detention by the percent of the time that any term
refers to pretrial detention. The resulting calculation indicates
what percent of the time the term “imprison” is used when a term
in the corpus refers to pretrial detention. If the corpus shows that
“imprison” is rarely used when referring to pretrial detention,
then it follows that the speaker (here, the legislative drafter)
probably wouldn’t have chosen “imprison” if meaning to refer to
pretrial detention.
We performed this analysis using both COCA and a corpus
comprised of all statutes in the U.S. Code. 333 Our corpus analysis
of COCA showed that at most 28% of references to detention without conviction used the term “imprison.” And in the U.S. Code, we
Id. at 1315, 1353–54.
See Corpus of the Current U.S. Code, BYU L. & CORPUS LINGUISTICS
https://lncl2.byu.edu/.
332
333
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found that “imprisoned” referred to detention without conviction
0% of the time—none of the references to detention without conviction in the U.S. Code used the term “imprison.”
This evidence lends support to the view that “imprison” is not
frequently used to refer to detention without conviction in the
U.S. Code. But in COCA, reflecting ordinary language usage, “imprison” refers to detention without conviction 28% of the time—
essentially just as often as the other two words (“confined” and
“detained”) that commonly refer to detention without conviction.
Because other terms are much more often used to refer to this sort
of detention, the corpus evidence also suggests that the public
may not understand “imprison” to refer to detention without conviction. We may thus expect the general public to sometimes use
“imprison” when they intend to refer to pretrial detention. 334
This corpus evidence is helpful for assessing the question presented in Mont. But even this kind of evidence would not necessarily be conclusive. There still remain underlying questions for
our legal theory of interpretation—questions as to the proper language community, and for what to make of this usage evidence.
Remember that the Mont majority seemingly was asking only
what “imprison” can permissibly mean in the context of this statute. And the corpus evidence doesn’t ultimately disprove that; in
fact, it confirms it. What the corpus evidence does tell us, however, is that “imprison” is a very unusual word choice for someone
who is seeking to refer to pre-conviction detainment—and perhaps a word choice that a drafter would not have used if the intent
was to cover that sort of detainment, or a word choice that the
general public would not be thinking of in relying on the language
of the law. And transparent analysis of this kind of evidence can
help refine questions for our legal theory to resolve.
Double-dissociation analysis thus gets us closer to painting a
full picture of the questions that lie at the threshold of our ordinary meaning inquiry. And we think that further development of
this point can help make corpus analysis even more useful.
A final refinement could be in integrating survey-based inquiries with corpus analysis. Above we identified a range of concerns with survey instruments. We stand by those concerns. But
we also find room for optimism about refinements that could be
made to survey methods that could help address the problems
that we have identified. As noted above, corpus tools are a good
334

See Appendix for tables presenting some details of our analysis.
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way to gather evidence of natural language use—language use
that takes place in natural linguistics settings and is not elicited
for the purposes of study through a survey or interview. There are
reasons to prefer such evidence, but also some limitations. A corpus may not have a sufficient number of examples of the language
use in question. And a corpus may not allow us to gather information about the pragmatic context of the communication—the
social or spatial context in which the communication occurred. An
advantage of survey methods is that the survey prompts may be
designed to more precisely take into account the syntactic and
pragmatic context of the communication under analysis. This was
demonstrated in a recent paper by Shlomo Klapper, Soren
Schmidt, and Tor Tarantola, in which survey respondents were
presented not only with prompts concerning the meaning of a
handful of words that are relevant to important Supreme Court
cases but also the factual background of those cases and precise
language of the statute in question. 335 We take exception to some
of the claims in existing work on using surveys in legal interpretation. The purported strength of survey methods can be a key
weakness—when we give survey respondents extensive detail
about the nature of a legal dispute (a civil case involving an insurance company, or a criminal case involving allegations of a
violent crime), the results may not give us linguistic information
at all—just a reaction to respondents’ priors about the litigants or
preference for a perceived “fair” outcome. 336 That said, we agree
that there may be ways in which surveys can be useful in evaluating claims about the meaning of legal texts, and there may be
information about language use and perception that a survey can
provide and that can’t be obtained from a corpus.
We are open to these and other possibilities. Although we see
inherent shortcomings of survey results, we concede that our corpus methods are also imperfect. Going forward, we envision a
framework in which the search for ordinary meaning is informed
by a sort of triangulation, in which corpus evidence, survey results, and purpose-based evidence are all brought to bear.
Corpus analysis, by the way, could also help refine the inquiry into legislative purpose. Our methods acknowledge the
335 See generally Shlomo Klapper, Soren Schmidt & Tor Tarantola, Ordinary Meaning from Ordinary People (July 17, 2020) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://perma.cc/ULB4-N5C5).
336 See Ben-Shahar & Strahilevitz, supra note 226, at 1780 (advancing the case for
the use of surveys in contract interpretation but acknowledging this concern).
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need to consider pragmatic context in assessing ordinary meaning. 337 Such context clearly encompasses legislative purpose. One
of the biggest problems with the inquiry into such purpose is the
cherry-picking concern—the “looking over a crowd and picking
out your friends” problem. 338 And corpus tools can help deal with
that problem. A legislative history corpus is already under construction. By searching such a corpus, an analyst could assemble
systematic evidence of language usage in the legislative body in a
more transparent attempt to assess legislative purpose.
Such an approach could help refine the Mont debate even further. Perhaps survey methods, properly controlled, could help further inform our understanding of the ordinary meaning of “imprisonment.” And a corpus analysis of the U.S Code Corpus and
a legislative history corpus could help systematize the inquiry
into legislative purpose.
We think this is the future of statutory interpretation. We
think corpus tools will be an important part of that future.

337
338

See Lee & Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, supra note 7, at 823–24.
Wald, supra note 100, at 214.

360

[88:275

The University of Chicago Law Review

APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we describe in more detail the corpus
analysis for United States v. Mont (described more briefly on
pages 64–66). Notably, this analysis went beyond the concordance
line analysis we showcased in Judging Ordinary Meaning; we
also engaged in double-dissociation analysis. We hope that this
Appendix can show how others can utilize double-dissociation
analysis (and can invite criticism to improve our methods).
A.I Corpus Analysis for Mont
Our first step was to code randomized concordance lines from
our chosen corpora for the operative term, “imprisoned.” We reviewed two hundred randomized concordance lines from COCA
and the Corpus of the Current U.S. Code. 339 The following meanings emerged:
TABLE I: MEANING FOR “IMPRISONED” IN THE U.S. CODE AND
COCA
Meaning
Detainment post-conviction
Detainment without conviction
Detainment generally (unclear if the term implies conviction)
Detainment in a non-U.S.
legal system 340
Unclear
Other (including metaphorical uses)
Total lines

U.S. Code
195 (97.5%)
0

COCA
30 (15%)
55 (27.5%)

1 (0.5%)

33 (16.5%)

4 (2%)

57 (28.5%)

0
0

4 (2%)
21 (10.5%)

200

200

339 For COCA, we limited our search to the 1990s. Although Congress enacted the
statute at issue in Mont in 1986, see Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments
Act of 1986, 99 Pub. L. 99-646, 100 Stat. 3592, we deemed it unlikely that a term like
“imprisoned” would change in meaning between 1986 and the turn of the millennium.
340 We decided to distinguish the uses of “imprisoned” referring to a foreign legal system. While we could have researched foreign legal systems to determine whether and
when they “convicted” (or similar), that inquiry was beyond the scope of this Article. Moreover, it’s unclear whether “imprisoned” referring to other countries’ penal systems necessarily informs what “imprisoned” means referring to the American system. Therefore, we
have set aside non-U.S. lines in our corpus analysis.
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In nearly all cases, “imprisoned” in the U.S. Code means
punishment after conviction. In COCA “imprisoned” refers to
“detainment post-conviction,” “detainment without conviction,”
and detainment generally at similar (though not equal) rates.
A.II Double-Dissociation Analysis
Following the lead of Professors Solan and Gales, 341 we also
pursued a double-dissociation analysis. That analysis asks how
often someone intending to communicate a particular meaning
(e.g., “detained post-conviction”) will choose to use a particular word
(e.g., “imprisoned”). If we construct a large domain of instances in
which someone uses a term to refer to “detained without conviction,” and “imprisoned” constitutes only a small percentage, this
would indicate that people usually don’t use the term “imprisoned” when they refer to “detained without conviction.” Not only
would language users not understand “imprisoned” to commonly
mean “detained without conviction,” they would also assume
that “imprisoned” did not communicate that meaning because
someone communicating “detained without conviction” would
use another term.
To operationalize this approach, two steps are necessary:
(1) constructing a domain of near-synonyms 342 for “imprisoned;”
and (2) observing these near-synonyms in context to see how often
the meaning “detained without conviction” arises.
We assembled a list of near-synonyms from seven thesauruses 343 and then reviewed four common synonyms of “imprisoned” for further analysis: incarcerated, confined, detained, and

341 See Tammy Gales & Lawrence M. Solan, Revisiting a Classic Problem in Statutory
Interpretation: Is a Minister a Laborer?, 36 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 481, 512 (2012) (“Following
the idea of double dissociation utilized in our earlier work, we examined instances of ‘work’
as a variation of ‘labor’ to see whether statutory language indeed covered a broader concept
of employment-related activity using a term other than ‘labor.’”).
342 See Philip Edmonds & Graeme Hirst, Near Synonomy and Lexical Choice, 28
COMPUTATIONAL LINGUISTICS 105, 107 (2002) (“Usually, words that are close in meaning
are near-synonyms . . . almost synonyms, but not quite; very similar, but not identical, in
meaning; not fully intersubstitutable, but instead varying in their shades of denotation,
connotation, implicature, emphasis, or register.”).
343 Several sources support using dictionaries and thesauruses to find near-synonyms.
Professor Dilin Liu of the University of Alabama used dictionaries, thesauruses, and synonym dictionaries to unearth near-synonyms. See generally Dilin Liu, Is It a Chief, Main,
Major, Primary, or Principal Concern?: A Corpus-Based Behavioral Profile Study of the NearSynonyms, 15 INT’L J. CORPUS LINGUISTICS 56 (2010).
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jailed. We could have included more, 344 but we included only the
more common synonyms to simplify our analysis.
To set up the double-dissociation analysis, we first noted how
frequently each term occurred in the corpora: 345
TABLE II: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF TERMS, RAW NUMBERS
Term
imprisoned
incarcerated
confined
detained
jailed

COCA, 1990s
1220
502
2376
800
689

U.S. Code
6381
637
1191
1497
274

Then we converted these raw numbers into decimal frequencies. Because it’s only necessary to understand the terms’ frequencies relative to each other, we used estimates of the actual
numbers of words in each database. For COCA, we assumed that
the corpus had 330 million words—one-third of the “billion
words” that COCA advertises (we narrowed our searched to onethird of the database—the 1990s—to review materials from closer
to the passage of the relevant act). For the Corpus of the Current
U.S. Code, we assumed that our corpus had 22 million words—a
number identified by a scholarly mathematical paper. 346 It doesn’t
matter if the corpora have more or less words that we expect; we
could have assumed that the corpora had only ten thousand words
to make our math a little more easily explained. In more formal
terms, we eventually divide this unit of measurement by the summated frequencies based on the same unit of measurement—
eliminating the unit of measurement and showing the relative
frequency as opposed to an actual measure of frequency.

344 Indeed, we originally reviewed two other terms—interned and impounded—and
discarded them from our analysis when we found essentially no results that referred to
someone detained without conviction in a U.S. jurisdiction.
345 To get enough results for all the terms in the U.S. Code corpus, we included lemmas (i.e., other forms of the words).
346 Michael J. Bommarito & Daniel Katz, A Mathematical Approach to the Study of
the United States Code 1 (Oct. 22, 2018) (unpublished manuscript)
(https://perma.cc/DB4C-DDPA).
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TABLE III: RELATIVE FREQUENCY OF TERMS, DECIMAL
Term
Imprisoned
Incarcerated
Confined
Detained
Jailed

COCA, 1990s
0.00000369696
0.00000152121
0.0000072
0.00000242424
0.00000208787

U.S. Code
0.00029004545
0.00002895454
0.00005413636
0.00006804545
0.00001245454

We then analyzed each of the near-synonyms for the previously identified meanings of “imprisoned.” For the sake of our
analysis, we could have just looked for results referring to one
secondary meaning of “imprisoned” to construct a domain of
terms referring to that meaning. But we reviewed for all the possible meanings so we can double dissociate for each meaning. We
coded two hundred lines of each term from each corpus:
TABLE IV: MEANINGS IN COCA
Meaning
Detained after
conviction
Detained
without
conviction
Detained
generally
Non-U.S.
legal system
Unclear
Other (including metaphorical)
Total lines

Imprisoned
30
(15%)
55
(27.5%)

Incarcerated
98
(44%)
22
(11%)

Confined
1
(0.5%)
32
(16%)

Detained
1
(0.5%)
81
(40.5%)

Jailed
36
(18%)
29
(14.5%)

33
(16.5%)
57
(28.5%)
4
(2%)
21
(10.5%)

58
(24%)
21
(10.5%)
0
1
(0.5%)

1
(0.5%)
5
(2.5%)
2
(1%)
159
(79.5%)

12
(6%)
90
(45%)
3
(1.5%)
13
(6.5%)

58
(29%)
76
(38%)
0
(0%)
1
(0.5%)

200

200

200

200

200
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TABLE V: MEANINGS IN THE U.S. CODE
Meaning
Detained after
conviction
Detained
without
conviction
Detained
generally
Non-U.S. legal
system
Unclear
Other (including metaphorical)
Total lines

Imprisoned
195
(97.5%)
0

Incarcerated
126
(63%)
7
(3.5%)

Confined
52
(26%)
23
(11.5%)

Detained
16 (8%)

1 (0.5%)

0

65
(32.5%)
2
(1%)
0

30
(15%)
27
(13.5%)
0

0

0

28
(14%)
2
(1%)
1
(0.5%)
94
(47%)

200

200

4 (2%)

200

126
(63%)

Jailed
4
(2%)
0
0
11
(5.5%)
0

1 (0.5%)

185
(92.5%)

200

200

We then multiplied the frequency with which a term appears
in the corpus (expressed as a decimal) by the percentage of the
time that the term communicates a particular meaning. The product is that percent of the time that any randomly chosen term in
the corpus is both (1) the relevant word itself (e.g., “confined”) and
(2) communicating a particular meaning (e.g., “detained without
conviction”). Next, we added the values in each row to estimate
the percent of words in the corpus that communicate a particular
meaning.
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TABLE VI: DOMAIN PERCENTAGES IN COCA
Meaning

Imprisoned
5.54544e-7
(33.6%)

Incarcerated
6.69332
4e-7
(40.5%)

Confined
3.6e-8
(2.2%)

Detained
1.21212
e-8
(0.7%)

Detained
without
conviction
Detained
generally

0.00000101
666
(28%)
6.099984
e-7
(35.7%)

1.67333
1e-7
(4.6%)
3.65090
4e-7
(20.7%)

0.00000
1152
(31.8%)
3.6e-8
(2%)

9.81817
2e-7
(27.1%)
1.45454
4e-7
(8.7%)

Non-U.S.
legal
system

0.00000105
363
(32.1%)

1.59727
05e-7
(4.9%)

1.8e-7
(5.5%)

0.00000
10909
(33.3%)

Unclear

7.39392e-8
(40.6%)

0

7.2e-8
(39.7%)

3.881808
e-7
(6.2%)

7.60605
e-9
(0.1%)

0.00000
5724
(91%)

3.63636
e-8
(20%)
1.57575
6e-7
(2.5%)

Detained
after
conviction

Other
(including
metaphorical)

Jailed

Total

3.7581
66e-7
(22.8%
)
3.0274
115e-7
(8.4%)
6.0548
23e-7
(34.4%
)
7.9339
06e-7
(24.2%
)
0

1.65|
e-6

1.0439
35e-8
(.2%)

6.29|
e-6

3.620
55e-6
1.76|
e-6
3.277
65e-6
1.82|
e-7
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TABLE VII: DOMAIN PERCENTAGES IN U.S. CODE
Meaning
Detained
after conviction
Detained
without
conviction
Detained
generally
Non-U.S.
legal
system
Unclear
Other
(including
metaphorical)

Imprisoned
0.000282
79431
(88.1%)
0
0.000001
45022
(5.1%)
0.000005
8009
(35.2%)
0

Incarcerated
0.00001
824136
(5.7%)
0.00000
10134
(2%)
0.00000
941022
(32.8%)
2.89545
4e-7
(1.8%)
0

0

0

Confined
0.00001
407545
(4.4%)
0.00000
622568
(12.4%)
0.00000
757909
(26.5%)
5.41363
6e-7
(3.3%)
1.65029
e-5
(100%)
0.00002
544408
(68.2%)

Detained
0.000005
44363
(1.7%)
0.000042
86863
(85.6%)
0.000010
20681
(35.6%)
0.000009
18613
(55.7%)
0
3.402272
5e-7
(0.9%)

Jailed

Total

2.49090
8e-7
(0.1%)
0

0.0003
20804

0

2.8646
3e-5

6.84999
7e-7
(4.2%)
0

1.6502
9e-5

0.00001
152044
(30.9%)

3.7304
7e-5

5.0107
7e-5

1.6502
9e-5

Ultimately, we can divide the value in each cell by the summated value in the “Total” column—that result is expressed as a
percentage in each cell. By dividing (a) the frequency at which a
term in the corpus is both a particular word and refers to a particular meaning, by (b) the frequency at which a term (any word)
in the corpus refers to a particular meaning, we measure (c) what
percent of words communicating a meaning are each particular
word.
A lower percentage indicates that someone communicating a
particular meaning will rarely choose to use that word. A higher
percentage indicates that people will often choose that word.

